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Full text of "The report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence for strategy regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs : hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, second session, October 6, 2004"

S. Hrg. 108-855 



THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO 
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
FOR STRATEGY REGARDING IRAQI WEAPONS 
OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS 




Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG. 108-855 

The Report of The Special Advls 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON AKMED SERVICES 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS 
SECOND SESSION 



OCTOBER 6, 2004 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 



SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS 
DEPOSITORY 



OCT 2 4 2005 




80ST0N PUBLIC LIBRARY 
GOVtRFri?^ENT DOCUMENTS DEf^T 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON : 2005 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 

Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 



S. Hrg. 108-855 



THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO 
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
FOR STRATEGY REGARDING IRAQI WEAPONS 
OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS 




Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG. 108-855 

The Report of The Special Advls 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON AKMED SERVICES 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS 
SECOND SESSION 



OCTOBER 6, 2004 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 



SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS 

DEPOSITORY 



OCT 2 4 2005 




80ST0N PUBLIC LIBRARY 
GOVtRhi?^ENT DOCUMENTS DEr^T 



23-081 PDF 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON : 2005 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (2021 512-1800 

Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 



COMMITTEE ON AEMED SERVICES 



JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas 
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado 
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri 
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carohna 
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 
JOHN CORNYN, Texas 



JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 



Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director 
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director 



(II) 



CONTENTS 



CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

The Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Centrai. Intel- 
ligence FOR Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Pro- 
grams 

OCTOBER 6, 2004 

Page 

Duelfer, Charles A., Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence 

on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction 6 

McMenamin, Brig. Gen. Joseph J., USMC, Commander, Iraq Survey Group ... 18 

(III) 



THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO 
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTEL- 
LIGENCE FOR STRATEGY REGARDING IRAQI 
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PRO- 
GRAMS 



WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 2004 

U.S. Senate, 
Committee on Armed Services, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:44 p.m. in room SH- 
216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) 
presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe, 
Allard, Sessions, Talent, Graham, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Reed, 
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Clinton, and 
Pryor. 

Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff direc- 
tor; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, professional 
staff member; Regina A. Dubey, research assistant; and Paula J. 
Philbin, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic 
staff director; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority counsel; Richard W. 
Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and William G.P. Monahan, 
minority counsel. 

Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell, Bridget E. Ward, 
and Nicholas West. 

Committee members' assistants present: Darren M. Dick, assist- 
ant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway, assistant to Senator Ses- 
sions; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; Clyde A. Tay- 
lor rV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Meredith Moseley, assistant 
to Senator Graham; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator 
Cornyn; Sharon L. Waxman and Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants to 
Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; 
Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; William K. 
Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to 
Senator E. Benjamin Nelson; Mark Phillip Jones, assistant to Sen- 
ator Dayton; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and 
Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor. 

(1) 



OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, 
CHAIRMAN 

Chairman Warner. The committee meets today to receive the 
testimony from Charles A. Duelfer, the Special Advisor to the Di- 
rector of Central Intelligence (DCI) on Iraq's Weapons of Mass De- 
struction (WMD), concerning his report on efforts to determine the 
status of WMD and related programs in Iraq. Mr. Duelfer is joined 
by Brigadier General Joseph P. McMenamin, United States Marine 
Corps, Military Commander of the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG). 

This is the sixth time the committee has received testimony from 
the top leaders of the ISG. Our committee views the work of this 
group as a very important part of our overall policy, objectives, and 
aims in Iraq. 

We welcome both. We thank you for your service under difficult 
and often personally dangerous conditions. When Senator Stevens, 
Senator Rollings, and I met with Mr. Duelfer and the ISG in Bagh- 
dad this past March, we witnessed first-hand the damaged vehicles 
that you utilize in the daily operation of your work and the con- 
sequent hazards that you face, not only yourself but all of your 
team. America, indeed the world, is indebted to you for this risky 
operation that you have performed and are continuing, General, to 
perform. 

The mission of the ISG has been to search for all facts — and I 
repeat, all facts — relevant to the many issues involving Iraqi WMD 
and related programs, their status in the past and today, and what 
they might have been in the future. This very complex, difficult 
mission will continue until all possible leads are exhausted. Pa- 
tience will continue to be required to ensure that this mission is 
completed with a thorough assessment of all facts. 

I think we should step back a minute in history and remember 
that the issue of Iraq's possession and use of WMD has a long his- 
tory. Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran during the Iran-Iraq 
War and against their own people, the Kurds. 

In 1991, following the first Gulf War, the United Nations (U.N.) 
Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which stated "Iraq shall 
unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harm- 
less under international supervision all chemical and biological 
weapons and stocks of agents and related subsystems and compo- 
nents and all research, development, support, and manufacturing 
facilities related thereto, all ballistic missiles with a range greater 
than 150 kilometers and related major parts and repair and pro- 
duction facilities." 

This was a clear statement of policy by the world community con- 
firming the existence of such weapons and programs. 

What followed was 12 years of Iraqi obstruction and 12 of the 17 
additional U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding Iraq com- 
pliance with its 1991 obligations to destroy its WMD and capabili- 
ties. In other words, the U.N. had to repeatedly try to enforce the 
purposes of Resolution 687 with subsequent resolutions. There was 
no doubt about Iraq's capabilities and intentions in this area in 
that period. 

Now, in November 2002 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 
recognized — I underline the word "recognized" — and I quote it, "the 
threat Iraq's noncompliance with Council resolutions and prolifera- 



tion of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses 
to international peace and security." 

Continuing, it said: "The fact that Iraq has not provided an accu- 
rate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by Resolution 
687 of all aspects of its programs to develop weapons of mass de- 
struction and ballistic missiles." 

We are still to this day seeking a full, final, and complete disclo- 
sure of all the facts on this issue, and I compliment both of you for 
your efforts to achieve that goal. In this hearing today we will re- 
ceive your assessment of what has been accomplished, what conclu- 
sions have been reached concerning Iraqi WMD programs, and 
what, in your professional judgment, remains to be done by the 
ISG. 

The findings of Mr. Duelfer and the ISG have been significant. 
While the ISG has not found stockpiles of WMD, the ISG and other 
coalition elements have developed a body of fact that shows that 
Saddam Hussein had: first, the strategic intention to continue to 
pursue WMD capabilities; and second, created ambiguity about his 
WMD capabilities that he used to extract concessions from the 
international community. He used it as a bargaining tactic and as 
a strategic deterrent against his neighbors and others. 

He had ongoing WMD research programs. He also had a capabil- 
ity for quickly reviving chemical weapons production, on a large 
scale within months. Examples: mustard gas within 3 to 6 months 
and nerve agents within 2 years. 

Furthermore, Saddam Hussein deceived U.N. inspectors for over 
12 years. Lastly, he systematically attempted to thwart and under- 
mine U.N. and other international sanctions. 

These are important lessons we must apply to current and future 
U.S. and international efforts to stop the scourge of proliferation of 
such weapons elsewhere in the world. 

It is clear from your statements, and Mr. Duelfer's reports, that 
your conclusions differ from the prewar assessments of our Intel- 
ligence Community, differ from the assessments of the U.N., and 
differ from the assessments of intelligence services of many other 
nations. That is a cause for concern. The Intelligence Committee 
report on prewar intelligence concerning WMD programs concluded 
that there v/ere shortcomings in the intelligence provided to the 
policymakers and to Congress. Your report lends credence to the 
conclusions of that committee. My understanding, I am a member 
of that committee, is that you testified before that committee this 
morning. 

We must understand why and take corrective measures. Our pol- 
icymakers must be able to rely on the intelligence they are pro- 
vided and our battlefield commanders must have sound intel- 
ligence. The lives of our men and women in uniform and many oth- 
ers are dependent on that intelligence, as is the security of our Na- 
tion. 

As we speak, over 1,700 individuals, military and civilian, are in 
Iraq and Qatar, continuing the search for facts about Iraq's WMD 
programs. The ISG has had some of the best and the brightest of 
our military and our Intelligence Community to accomplish this 
task, and we thank them for their service. 



Thank you, Mr. Duelfer, for the service that you have provided 
to our Nation; and, General McMenamin, for the service that you 
and the ISG are continuing to provide. We look forward to your tes- 
timony. 

fThe prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:! 

Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner 

The committee meets today to receive testimony from Charles A. Duelfer, the Spe- 
cial Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Programs concerning his report on efforts to determine the status of 
weapons of mass destruction and related programs in Iraq. Mr. Duelfer is joined by 
Brigadier General Joseph J. McMenamin, USMC, Military Commander of the Iraq 
Survey Group. This is the sixth time the Committee has received testimony from 
the top leaders of the Iraq Survey Group. 

We welcome Mr. Duelfer and General McMenamin today. We thank you for your 
service under difficult, dangerous conditions. When Senator Stevens, Senator Hol- 
lings and I met with Mr. Duelfer and the ISG in Baghdad in March, the bullet-rid- 
dled vehicles outside your headquarters were testament to the hazards you and your 
team endure on a daily basis. 

The mission of the Iraq Survey Group has been to search for all facts relevant 
to the many issues involving Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and related pro- 
grams. This very complex, difficult mission will continue on until all possible leads 
are exhausted. Patience will continue to be required to ensure we complete a thor- 
ough assessment of this important issue. 

In this hearing today, we will receive your assessment of what has been accom- 
plished, what conclusions you have reached concerning Iraqi WMD and programs, 
and what, in your professional judgment, remains to be done by the Iraq Survey 
Group. 

The findings of the Mr. Duelfer and the Iraq Survey Group have been significant. 
While the ISG has not found stockpiles of WMD, the ISG and other coalition ele- 
ments have developed a body of fact that shows that Saddam Hussein had: 

• the strategic intention to continue to pursue WMD capabilities; 

• created ambiguity about his WMD capabilities that he used to extract 
concessions on the international stage and as a strategic deterrent; 

• ongoing WMD research programs; 

• a capability for quickly reviving chemical weapons production on a large 
scale within months — mustard gas within 3-6 months and nerve agents 
within 2 years; 

• deceived U.N. inspectors for over 12 years; and 

• systematically attempted to thwart and undermine U.N. and other inter- 
national sanctions. 

These are important lessons we must apply to current and future U.S. and inter- 
national efforts to stop the scourge of proliferation around the world. 

It is clear from your statements and Mr. Duelfer's report that your conclusions 
differ from the pre-war assessments of our intelligence community, differ from the 
assessments of the U.N., and differ from the assessments of intelligence services of 
many other nations. That is cause for concern. The Intelligence Committee report 
on pre-war intelligence concerning WMD programs concluded that there were short- 
comings in the intelligence provided to the policymakers and to Congress. Your re- 
port lends credence to those conclusions. We must understand why and take correc- 
tive measures. Our policymakers must be able to rely on the intelligence they are 
provided, and our battlefield commanders must have sound intelligence. The lives 
of our men and women in uniform depend on it, as does the security of our Nation. 

As we speak, over 1,700 individuals — military and civilian — are in Iraq and Qatar 
continuing the search for facts about Iraq's WMD programs. The ISG has some of 
the best and the brightest of our military and our Intelligence Community to accom- 
plish this task, and we thank them for their service. 

We thank Mr. Duelfer for the service he has provided to our Nation and General 
McMenamin for the service he and the ISG continue to provide. We look forward 
to your testimony. 

Senator Levin. 



STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN 

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first join you 
in welcoming our witnesses, Mr. Duelfer and General McMenamin. 
Thank you both for your presence and for your service to this Na- 
tion. 

The Iraq Survey Group began its mission in June 2003. Its mis- 
sion was very clear and it was stated to be the following by the 
former DCI, George Tenet: "Search for Iraq's weapons of mass de- 
struction." It has been 15 months since the ISG began its work. 
The ISG, with some 1,750 employees and having made visits to 
1,200 suspect WMD sites, has not found WMD in Iraq, nor evi- 
dence that Iraq had stockpiles of such weapons at the start of the 
war. 

It is important to emphasize that central fact because the admin- 
istration's case for going to war against Iraq rested on the twin ar- 
guments that Saddam Hussein had existing stockpiles of WMD and 
that he might give WMD to al Qaeda to attack us, as al Qaeda had 
attacked us on September 11. So the fundamental conclusion of the 
ISG effort means that the administration's two major arguments 
for going to war against Iraq were incorrect. 

We did not go to war because Saddam had future intentions to 
obtain WMD. The administration told the American people that we 
had to attack Iraq because Iraq possessed stockpiles of WMD and 
that they were allied with terrorists like al Qaeda, to whom Iraq 
would like to give such weapons. 

Here are just a few examples: 

In August 2002, Vice President Cheney said, "Simply stated, 
there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass 
destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against 
our friends, our allies, and against us." 

President Bush asserted on September 26, 2002, that, "The Iraqi 
regime possesses biological and chemical weapons." One day later 
he spoke of "The stockpiles of anthrax that we know he has or VX, 
the biological weapons which he possesses." 

In September 2003, Vice President Cheney described Iraq as the 
"geographic base of the terrorists who have had us under assault 
now for many years, but most especially on September 11." 

On October 7, 2002, President Bush said: "Iraq could decide on 
any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a ter- 
rorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could 
allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without allowing any fin- 
gerprints." 

In his March 17, 2003, speech to the Nation on the eve of the 
war. President Bush said, "The danger is clear. Using chemical, bi- 
ological, or one day nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, 
the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands 
or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any 
other." 

Now, these are just a few examples of many similar statements 
made by senior administration officials before the war. So today be- 
fore we delve into a speculative discussion about Saddam's possible 
future intentions with respect to WMD, it is important to return 
to the starting point for the administration's argument for going to 



war. Namely, that Saddam possessed stockpiles of chemical and bi- 
ological weapons and might give them to terrorists to attack us. 

We have heard many claims before the war about Iraq's weapons 
and efforts to build more deadly weapons. The American people 
were told about aluminum tubes that Vice President Cheney said 
we knew with "absolute certainty" were intended for nuclear weap- 
ons, and which Condoleezza Rice said were "really only suitable for 
nuclear weapons programs." 

We were told about unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in Saddam 
Hussein's possession that were intended for delivering biological 
weapons, including against the U.S. homeland. We were told about 
Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium from Africa. These allegations, like 
the assertions about Iraq having WMD and their stockpiles, were 
all wrong, and that is what today's report will state. 

After the war started, the administration began an effort to 
change the subject of the debate, from the actual presence of WMD 
to WMD programs, then to WMD-related program activities, and 
more recently to speculation about intentions. However, that effort 
cannot obscure the historical fact and the critical fact that is most 
critical to the American people, that, as President Bush's Press 
Secretary acknowledged "Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. 
That is what the war was about and is about." 

We welcome this report today. We commend both of you again 
for making yourselves available today. We also want to thank you 
for making this an unclassified report. Given the importance of this 
issue, the public deserves to know as much as possible about the 
details. We look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin. 

Mr. Duelfer. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES A DUELFER, SPECIAL ADVISOR TO 
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON IRAQ'S 
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

Mr. Duelfer. Senators, thank you very much for the opportunity 
to appear here today. 

Chairman Warner. You have an extensive prepared written 
statement, which will be placed into the record in its entirety. The 
same with you. General. 

Mr. Duelfer. Okay, thank you. 

I would also like to thank those of you who came out and visited 
in Baghdad. That means a lot to the people doing this work, to 
know that there are people who really are interested in the work 
that goes on out there. I know it is a difficult trip to make. It is 
not a safe trip to make but I welcome it. I know that General 
McMenamin welcomes it and I think it is a useful thing to do. You 
do get a sense of what goes on on the ground. Thank you very 
much. 

The relationship between Iraq and the rest of the world has been 
complicated and dangerous for three decades, a dilemma that has 
confounded the international community through much of recent 
history. Three wars, devastating sanctions, and an endless progres- 
sion of intelligence crises have eroded or ruined thousands of lives. 
The region and Iraq are both complicated and unstable and obvi- 
ously very dangerous. Weapons of mass destruction have added to 



the uncertainty and risk posed by an unpredictable and clearly ag- 
gressive regime in Baghdad. 

This report is not simply an accounting of the program fragments 
that we have examined in the aftermath of the recent war and the 
ongoing conflict. Nor is it my aim merely to describe the status of 
a program at a single point in time. The complexity and importance 
of the question deserve a more synthetic approach in my opinion. 
Instead, the objective of this report is to identify the dynamics of 
the regime's WMD decisions over time. I want to identify the area 
under the curve, not just a single point on a trend line that may 
be going up or down. In other words, this problem deserves cal- 
culus, not algebra. Thus, the report I have prepared attempts to de- 
scribe Iraqi WMD programs, not in isolation, but in the context of 
the aims and objectives of the regime that created and used them, 
which is not to say that I am not going to look at the artifacts and 
what we did find at the given point in time when we began work. 

I have also insisted that the report include as much basic data 
as reasonable and that it be unclassified. Since the tragedy that 
has been Iraq has exacted such a huge cost for so many for so long, 
I feel strongly that the data we have accumulated be presented in 
as thorough a manner as possible to enable others to draw their 
own conclusions. Certainly I have a concept of the dynamics that 
underlay the course that Saddam followed with WMD and this is 
conveyed in the report. Others, including Iraqis themselves, may 
examine this and conclude otherwise. 

The report consists of six chapters and includes, at the end, a 
timeline showing key events that bear on the Iraqi WMD program. 
Aiming to introduce the reader to the Iraqi frame of reference, the 
report begins with an analysis of the nature of the regime and its 
aims in chapter one. As compared with most countries, fathoming 
the intentions of the regime is made easier in Iraq because it really 
boils down to understanding one person, Saddam Hussein, who was 
the regime. The highly personalized nature of the Iraqi dictatorship 
under Saddam, with its multiplicity of security organs and unclear, 
often overlapping lines of authority, progressively created a govern- 
mental system of operating alien to those steeped in the norms of 
western democracies. 

An understanding of the workings of the Iraqi system of govern- 
ance is important so that evidence, or the lack of evidence, can be 
evaluated within the frame of reference of Baghdad and not the 
frame of reference of Washington, London, or Canberra. For exam- 
ple, given the nature of Iraqi governance, one should not look for 
much of an audit trail on WMD. Even Saddam's most senior min- 
isters did not want to be in a position to tell him bad news or make 
recommendations fi'om which he would recoil. The most successful 
and long-lived advisors were those who could anticipate his inten- 
tions. Hence, there was a very powerful role for implicit guidance. 
This was particularly the case for the most sensitive issues, such 
as actions related to human rights or WMD. 

This dynamic limits the evidence that one might expect to find, 
that is, little documentation or senior advisors who could honestly 
say that they had instructions on certain matters. This of course 
makes it risky to draw conclusions about the absence of evidence, 
a continuous problem that we found in Iraq. 



8 

Further obfuscating the picture is the fact that Baghdad had 
long experience in deahng with inspection by western outsiders. 
From the experience of deahng with U.N. inspectors, the Iraqis 
learned a great deal about what signatures we looked for, and I 
point out I spent many years in that activity myself. Iraqis gen- 
erally knew a lot more about us than we did about them. For var- 
ious reasons, their ability and desire to conceal their intentions and 
capabilities were quite good. 

Beyond a discussion of how the regime operated, the report also 
provides a sense of Saddam's goals, aspirations, and political vision 
as a means to better understand his decisions about WMD, their 
development, use, and destruction and role in the future realization 
of his political-military aims for the Iraqi nation. 

We have tried to understand his objectives and how he developed 
and used power. I point out that after the 1991 war Saddam estab- 
lished as his prime objective, taking into account survival of course, 
the termination of U.N. sanctions on Iraq and he weighed all policy 
actions and steps for their impact on this overarching objective. 

Saddam committed the brightest minds and much national treas- 
ure to developing WMD. Moreover, Saddam saw this investment as 
having paid vital dividends. Senior Iraqis state that only through 
the use of long-range ballistic missiles and the extensive use of 
chemical weapons did Iraq avoid defeat in the war with Iran, and 
there was a second, less obvious instance where the regime at- 
tributes its survival to the possession of WMD. In the run-up to the 
1991 war, Iraq loaded, dispersed, and Saddam pre-delegated the 
authority to use biological and chemical weapons if the coalition 
proceeded to Baghdad. 

The regime and Saddam believed that the possession of WMD 
deterred the United States from going to Baghdad in 1991. More- 
over, it has been clear, in my discussions with senior Iraqis, that 
they clearly understand that they blundered in invading Kuwait 
before completing their nuclear weapons program. Had they wait- 
ed, the outcome would have been quite different. 

Finally, Saddam also used chemical weapons for domestic pur- 
poses, in the late 1980s against the Kurds and, as we learned in 
our work at ISG, during the Shia uprisings immediately after the 
1991 war. 

Again, in this first chapter, aspects of Saddam's decisionmaking 
were examined by identification of several key inflection points 
when Saddam made a choice affecting WMD. Several such points 
have been identified and dissected to see the dynamics of these de- 
cisions. This tool of using a timeline and identifying key inflection 
points is also useful in tracking his strategy and tactics toward the 
U.N. and the sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council. 
Saddam's personal direction of much of Iraq's relations with the 
U.N. reflected his approach to influence and is described in some 
detail in the report. 

Overall, the hope is that not only will we see what Saddam de- 
cided to do with WMD, but why. This may be instructive for future 
policy considerations and certainly for future intelligence consider- 
ations. 

The second chapter of the report is an extensive analysis of Iraq's 
financing and procurement, our bid to identify the resources avail- 



able to Baghdad and examine how they were allocated. We made 
it a high priority to obtain complete information from the Oil Min- 
istry and the State Oil Marketing Organization. These data were 
extremely valuable in obtaining an understanding of how the re- 
gime operated in its priorities. This is a way of bounding the prob- 
lem in a sense. Because Iraq had limited resources, that was one 
of the ways we could delimit our analysis. It turned out to be quite 
instructive. 

Our investigation makes clear that the top priority for Saddam 
was to escape the economic stranglehold of the U.N. sanctions. 
Sanctions limited his ambitions in many ways and took an enor- 
mous toll on Iraqi society. The disintegration of the middle class, 
civil infrastructure, the health system, and the blight on the hope 
of young Iraqis were clear through the 1990s. The U.N. Security 
Council, in attempting to mitigate the effects of sanctions on inno- 
cent Iraqis, created the Oil-for-Food program. It is instructive that 
the regime rejected the opportunity to export oil for civil goods 
until conditions were so bad that they threatened the survival of 
the regime. 

This chapter makes clear the range of steps the regime took to 
erode support for and the efficacy of the U.N. sanctions program. 
The steps the regime took to erode sanctions are obvious in the 
analysis of how revenues, particularly those derived from the Oil- 
for-Food program, were used. Over time sanctions had steadily 
weakened, to the point where Iraq, in roughly the 2000 to 2001 
time frame, was confidently designing missiles around components 
that could only be obtained outside of sanctions. Moreover, illicit 
revenues grew to quite substantial levels during this same period, 
and it is instructive to see how and where the regime allocated 
these funds. 

Our investigation also makes quite clear how Baghdad exploited 
the mechanism for executing the Oil-for-Food program to give indi- 
viduals and countries an economic stake in ending sanctions. The 
regime followed a pattern that Saddam has applied throughout his 
career of offering rewards and a rationale for accepting them, suc- 
cessfully arguing its case that the sanctions were harming the in- 
nocent and that the moral choice was to elude and diminish them. 

It is grossly obvious how successful the regime was. It is also 
grossly obvious how the sanctions perverted not just the national 
system of finance and economics, but to some extent international 
markets and organizations. The procurement and finance section 
notes that a sizable portion of the illicit revenues generated under 
the Oil-for-Food program went to the Military-Industrial Commis- 
sion, that is the government-run military-industrial establishment. 
The ftinding for this organization, which had responsibility for 
many of the past WMD programs, went from approximately $7.8 
million in 1998 to $350 million in 2001. During this period of grow- 
ing resource availability, many military programs were carried out, 
including many involving the willing export to Iraq of military 
items prohibited by the Security Council. I would note that some 
members of the Security Council participated in violating those 
very same resolutions. 

The remaining four chapters deal with the different types of 
WMD programs which Iraq had previously worked. The first of 



10 

these, the dehvery system chapter, describes the work Iraq had 
been pursuing with respect to missiles and UAVs. Iraq continued 
to work on missile delivery systems in the wake of the Gulf War. 
Some missile activity was permitted in fact by the U.N. resolutions. 

Saddam drew a distinction, however, between long-range missiles 
and other WMD, a distinction not drawn in the U.N. resolutions. 
Iraq's missile development infrastructure continued to develop 
under sanctions and included work on propulsion, fuels, and even 
guidance systems. As more funding became available following the 
implementation of the Oil-for-Food program, Saddam directed more 
missile activities. In the latter years, more foreign assistance was 
brought in, including both technology and technical expertise. 

While it is clear that Saddam wanted a long-range missile, there 
was little work done on warheads. It is apparent that he drew the 
line at that point, so long as sanctions remained. However, while 
the development of ballistic missile delivery systems is time-con- 
suming, if and when Saddam decided to place a nonconventional 
warhead on the missile this could be done quite quickly. The chem- 
ical weapons and biological weapons warheads put on Iraqi mis- 
siles in 1990 and 1991, for example, were built in months. 

A couple of points are of interest from the Iraqi missile efforts. 
One is that they did not abide by the range limits set in U.N. Secu- 
rity Council Resolution 686. The range capabilities of the ballistic 
missiles they were developing exceeded the stated limits. Iraq also 
used components from SA-2 surface-to-air missile engines that 
they had been expressly prohibited from doing. Iraq also produced 
fuel that was not declared. They also tested UAVs in excess of the 
range limits. 

Iraq missile developers became so confident that others would 
violate the sanctions that they designed new missile systems which 
depended upon the import of guidance systems, which were prohib- 
ited by sanctions. Further, they drew upon foreign expertise that 
was readily available for such areas as propulsion, again in viola- 
tion of the sanctions. 

The next chapter is on nuclear programs and it reviews the pro- 
gram up to the 1991 war and describes the activities of the sci- 
entists and engineers following the war. The analysis shows that 
despite Saddam's expressed desire to retain knowledge of his nu- 
clear team and his attempts to retain some key parts of the pro- 
gram, during the course of the following 12 years Iraq's ability to 
produce a weapon decayed steadily. 

Sanctions and inspections lasted longer than Saddam antici- 
pated. The inspections were also much more intrusive than ex- 
pected. Therefore, retention of weapons material put at risk his 
higher immediate objective of escaping sanctions. Nevertheless, 
Saddam's son-in-law and chief weapons developing manager, Hus- 
sein Kamal, directed that design information and very limited 
physical material be hidden from inspectors. These concealment ef- 
forts were successful until Hussein Kamal fled to Jordan in 1995. 

There were also efforts to retain the intellectual capital of nu- 
clear scientists by forbidding their departure from Iraq and keeping 
them employed in government areas. However, over time there was 
decay in the team. Unlike other WMD areas, nuclear weapons de- 
velopment requires thousands of knowledgeable scientists as well 



11 

as a large physical plant. Even with the intention of keeping these 
talented people employed, a natural decay took place and the time 
it would take for Iraq to build a nuclear weapon tended to increase 
for the duration of the sanctions. 

The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission utilized the same people on 
a range of projects during the 1990s and addressed technical prob- 
lems akin to those in nuclear weapons development. These efforts, 
however, cannot be explicitly tied to an intention to revive a nu- 
clear weapons program. 

Despite this decay, Saddam did not abandon his nuclear ambi- 
tions. He made his view clear that nuclear weapons were the right 
of any country that could build them. He was very attentive to the 
growing Iranian threat, especially its potential nuclear component, 
and he stated that he would do whatever it took to offset the Ira- 
nian threat, clearly implying matching Tehran's nuclear capabili- 
ties. 

Saddam observed that India and Pakistan had slipped across the 
nuclear weapons boundary quite successfully. Those around Sad- 
dam seemed quite convinced that once sanctions were ended and 
all other things being equal, Saddam would renew his efforts in 
this field. 

The chapters dealing with chemical weapons and biological weap- 
ons tell somewhat different stories. In the chemical weapons area, 
the Iraqis had long experience with production and use of mustard 
and nerve agents. In Baghdad's view, these weapons saved Iraq 
from defeat in the war with Iran and, in combination with biologi- 
cal weapons capabilities, deterred the United States from deposing 
the regime in 1991. Following the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi chemical 
weapons activity shifted from production to research and develop- 
ment of more potent and stabilized agents. In contrast to the nu- 
clear field, chemical weapons work requires not thousands of sci- 
entists, but hundreds. The top expertise was developed among a 
few dozen scientists and chemical production engineers. 

Once inspections began in 1991, Iraq chose to yield most of its 
weapons and bulk agent as well as the large facilities that were 
widely known to exist. As in the other WMD areas, Saddam sought 
to sustain the request knowledge base to restart the program even- 
tually and, to the extent it did not threaten the Iraqi effort to get 
out from sanctions, he chose to sustain the inherent capability to 
produce such weapons as circumstances permitted in the future. 

Over time and with the infusion of funding and resources follow- 
ing acceptance of the Oil-for-Food program, Iraq effectively short- 
ened the time that would be required to reestablish the chemical 
weapons production capacity. Some of this was a natural collateral 
benefit of developing an indigenous chemical production infrastruc- 
ture. By 2003, Iraq would have been able to produce mustard agent 
in a period of months and nerve agent in less than 1 or 2 years. 
We have not come across explicit guidance from Saddam on this 
point. Yet it was an inherent consequence of his decision to develop 
a domestic chemical production capacity. 

Iraq denied it had offensive biological weapons programs to in- 
spectors in 1991 and secretly destroyed existing stocks of weapons 
and agent in 1991 to 1992. Iraq decided to retain the main biologi- 
cal weapons production facility, but under a guise of using it to 



12 

produce single-cell protein for animal feed. These decisions were 
taken with Saddam's explicit approval. Saddam clearly understood 
the nature of biological weapons. He personally authorized their 
dispersal for use in 1991 against coalition forces, Saudi Arabia, and 
Israel. He clearly took steps to preserve this capability and was 
successful until 1995. 

Preservation of Iraq's biological weapons capabilities was simpler 
than any other WMD area because of the nature of the material. 
First, the number of experts required is quite small, perhaps a cou- 
ple dozen. Then too, the infrastructure to produce agent can be 
readily assembled from quite simple domestic civilian plants. More- 
over, little, if any, activity would be necessary to keep this option 
on the shelf. 

Some activity that might have been related to a biological pro- 
gram has been examined closely, including work with a bio-pes- 
ticide, bacillus thuringiensis. While this work could have been re- 
lated to advancing Iraqi anthrax knowledge, information is incon- 
clusive. This work could and certainly did sustain the talent need- 
ed to restart a potential biological weapons program. However, we 
can form no absolute conclusion whether this work represented ac- 
tive efforts to develop further anthrax programs. Given the devel- 
oping infrastructure in Iraq in the late 1990s and early 2000, such 
a reconstitution could be accomplished quite quickly. 

Other aspects of the Iraqi biological weapons program remain 
cloudy. For example, it is still difficult to rule on whether Iraq had 
a mobile biological weapons production effort or made any attempts 
to work with smallpox as a weapon. We were able to eliminate 
some of the questions and resolve some of the questions which cir- 
culated about the mobile question earlier, and I can deal with those 
in questioning. 

What is clear is that Saddam retained his notions of the use of 
force and had experience that demonstrated the utility of WMD. He 
was making progress in eroding sanctions, a lot of progress, and 
had it not been for the events of September 11, 2001, things would 
have taken a very different course for the regime. Most senior 
members of the regime and scientists assumed that the programs 
would begin in earnest when sanctions ended, and sanctions were 
eroding. 

A variety of questions about Iraqi WMD capabilities and inten- 
tions remain unanswered even after extensive investigation by 
ISG. For example, we cannot yet definitively say whether or not 
WMD materials were transferred out of Iraq before the war. Nei- 
ther can we definitively answer some questions about possible re- 
tained stocks, though, as I say, it is my judgment that retained 
stocks do not exist. 

Developments in the Iraqi Intelligence Services appear to have 
been limited in scope, and I am referring here to some laboratories 
which were discovered in late 2003 where the Iraqi Intelligence 
Service was found conducting some work in chemical and biological 
areas. But certainly these activities were not declared to the U.N. 
What did they really represent and was there a more extensive 
clandestine activity with another set of technical experts? We can- 
not say yet for certain. 



13 

Opportunities to develop new information are decreasing. How- 
ever, I must mention that we just came into possession of a large 
number of documents recently accumulated by coalition forces. The 
number of these documents is approximately equal to the total re- 
ceived since the end of the war and it will clearly take many 
months to examine what has been found and provide an initial 
summary of what they contain. 

Then too, we continue to receive a continuous stream of reports 
about hidden WMD locations. When such reports are judged suffi- 
ciently credible, ISG conducts an investigation. In fact, 2 weeks ago 
we had a source come to us with a partially filled canister from an 
old — and I repeat and underline, old — 122 millimeter rocket round. 
These, like others recovered, are from pre- 1991 stocks and, despite 
these reports and finds, I still do not expect that militarily signifi- 
cant WMD stocks are hidden in Iraq. 

A risk that has emerged since my previous report to Congress is 
the connection of former regime chemical warfare expertise with 
anti-coalition forces. The ISG has uncovered evidence of such links 
and undertook a sizable effort to track down and prevent any lash- 
up between foreign terrorists or anti-coalition forces and either ex- 
isting chemical weapons stocks or expertise from the former regime 
that could be used to produce such weapons. I believe we got ahead 
of this problem through a series of raids throughout the spring and 
summer. I am convinced that we successfully contained the prob- 
lem before it matured into a major threat. 

Nevertheless, it points to the problem that the dangerous exper- 
tise developed by the previous regime could be transferred to other 
hands. Certainly there are anti-coalition and terrorist elements 
seeking such capabilities. 

It is my hope that this report will offer a generally accurate pic- 
ture of the evolution and disposition of WMD within the former re- 
gime. I am quite aware that the Iraqis who participated in these 
programs will be reading this report and ultimately will comment 
upon it. I hope they learn from it and do not find too many errors. 

I have spent hours with many of the Iraqi participants, both be- 
fore the war as Deputy Chairman of the U.N. Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) in the 1990s and after the war when many were in cus- 
tody. Many of these individuals are technocrats caught in a rotten 
system. Some, on the other hand, wholeheartedly participated in 
that system. In either case, Saddam channeled some of the best 
and brightest Iraqi minds and a substantial portion of Iraq's 
wealth toward his WMD programs. 

It has of course been very difficult to discern the truth from 
these participants, given the mix of motivations that inescapably 
color the statements of those who remain in custody. It is some- 
times very difficult to recognize the truth. 

This applies to Saddam himself, especially so. He was a special 
case in all of this. We had the opportunity to debrief him for 
months, but he naturally had limited incentives to be candid or 
forthcoming at all. Nevertheless, many of his statements were in- 
teresting and revealing. In the end, only he knows many of the 
vital points. Even those closest to him had mixed understandings 
of his objectives. In fact, there was uncertainty among some of the 
closest advisors about WMD and whether it even existed. 



14 

With that, Senator, I will end my remarks. Thank you. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Duelfer follows:] 

Prepared Statement by Charles Duelfer 

Thank you for inviting me to discuss my report with your committee. 

The relationship between Iraq and the rest of the world has been complicated and 
dangerous for three decades, a dilemma that has confounded the international com- 
munity through much of recent history. Three wars, devastating sanctions, and an 
endless progression of international crises have ended or ruined thousands of lives. 
The region and Iraq are both complicated and unstable, and obviously very dan- 
gerous. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have added to the uncertainty and 
risk posed by an unpredictable and clearly aggressive regime in Baghdad. 

This report is not simply an accounting of the program fragments we have exam- 
ined in the aftermath of the recent war and ongoing conflict, nor is it my aim merely 
to describe the status of a program at a single point in time. The complexity and 
importance of this question deserves a more synthetic approach, in my view. In- 
stead, the objective of this report is to identify the dynamics of the regime's WMD 
decisions over time. I want to identify the area under a curve, not just a single point 
on a trend line that may be going up or down. This problem deserves calculus not 
algebra, and thus the report I have prepared attempts to describe the Iraqi WMD 
programs not in isolation, but in the context of the aims and objectives of the regime 
that created and used them. 

I have also insisted that the report include as much basic data as reasonable and 
that it be unclassified. Since the tragedy that has been Iraq has exacted such a huge 
cost for so many for so long, I feel strongly that the data we have accumulated be 
presented in as thorough a manner as possible to enable others to draw their own 
conclusions. Certainly I have a concept of the d)mamics that underlay the course 
that Saddam followed with WMD and this is conveyed in the report. Others, includ- 
ing Iraqis, may examine this and conclude otherwise. 

STRUCTURE 

The report consists of six chapters and includes at the end a timeline showing key 
events that bear on the Iraqi WMD program. 

Aiming to introduce the reader to the Iraqi frame of reference, the report begins 
with an analysis of the nature of the regime and its aims in chapter one. As com- 
pared with most countries, fathoming the intentions of the regime is made easier 
in Iraq, because it really boils down to understanding one person — Saddam Hussein, 
who was the regime. The highly personalized nature of the Iraqi dictatorship under 
Saddam, with its multiplicity of security organs and unclear, often overlapping lines 
of authority progressively created a governmental system of operating alien to those 
steeped in the norms of western democracies. An understanding of the workings of 
the Iraqi system of governance is important, so that evidence — or lack of evidence — 
can be evaluated within the frame of reference of Baghdad and not the frame of ref- 
erence of Washington, London, or Canberra. 

For example, given the nature of Iraqi governance, one should not look for much 
of an audit trail on WMD. Even Saddam's most senior ministers did not want to 
be in a position to tell him bad news or make recommendations from which he 
would recoil. The most successful and long-lived advisors were those who could an- 
ticipate his intentions. Hence, there was a very powerful role for implicit guidance. 
This was particularly the case for the most sensitive issues — such as actions that 
related to human rights and weapons of mass destruction. This dynamic limits the 
evidence that one might expect to find, i.e. little documentation and senior advisors 
who could honestly say they never had instructions on certain matters. This, of 
course, makes it risky to draw conclusions about the absence of evidence, a continu- 
ous problem in Iraq. 

Further obfuscating the picture is the fact that Baghdad had long experience in 
dealing with inspection by western outsiders. From the experience of dealing with 
U.N. inspectors the Iraqis learned a great deal about what signatures we looked for. 
Iraqis generally knew a lot more about us than we did about them. For various rea- 
sons, their ability and desire to conceal their intentions and capabilities were quite 
good. 

Beyond a discussion of how the regime operated, the report also provides a sense 
of Saddam's goals, aspirations and political vision, as a means to better understand 
his decisions about WMD, their development, use, destruction, and role in the future 
realization of his political-military aims for the Iraqi nation. We have tried to under- 
stand his objectives and how he developed and used power. After the 1991 war. Sad- 



15 

dam established as his prime objective (after survival) the termination of U.N. sanc- 
tions on Iraq, and he weighed all policy actions and steps for their impact on this 
overarching objective. 

Saddam committed the brightest minds and much national treasure to developing 
WMD. Moreover, Saddam saw this investment as having paid vital dividends. Sen- 
ior Iraqis state that only through the use of long-range ballistic missiles and the 
extensive use of chemical weapons did Iraq avoid defeat in the war with Iran. There 
is also a second, less obvious instance where the regime attributes its survival to 
possession of WMD. 

In the nm-up to the 1991 war, Iraq loaded, dispersed and pre-delegated the au- 
thority to use both biological and chemical weapons if the coalition proceeded to 
Baghdad. The regime believes its possession of WMD deterred the U.S. from going 
to Baghdad in 1991. Moreover, it has been clear in my discussions with senior Iraqis 
that they clearly understand that they blundered in invading Kuwait before com- 

Eleting their nuclear weapons program. Had they waited, the outcome would have 
een quite different. 

Finally, Saddam also used chemical weapons for domestic purposes — in the late 
1980s against the Kurds and during the Shia uprisings after the 1991 war. 

In this chapter, aspects of Saddam's decisionmaking were examined by the identi- 
fication of several key inflection points, when Saddam made a choice affecting 
WMD. Several such points have been identified and dissected to see the djoiamics 
of these decisions. These points noted in the timeline attached to the end of the re- 
port, portions of which are included at the end of individual chapters. The timeline 
is a useful tool through which to retain the ability to assess Iraq's WMD decision- 
making from Saddam's perspective and seeing WMD in that context. 

This tool was also useful in tracking his strategy and tactics toward the United 
Nations and the sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council. Saddam's personal 
direction of much of Iraq's relations with the U.N. reflected his approach to influ- 
ence and is described in some detail — again illuminated through examination of key 
decision points. 

Overall, the hope is that not only will we see what Saddam decided to do with 
WMD, but why. This may be instructive for future policy considerations and cer- 
tainly future intelligence considerations. 

Chapter two is an extensive analysis of Iraq's financing and procurement, a bid 
to identify the resources available to Baghdad and examine how they were allocated. 
We made it a high priority to obtain complete information from the Oil Ministry 
and State Oil Marketing Organization. These data were extremely valuable in ob- 
taining an understanding of how the regime operated and its priorities. 

Our investigation makes clear that a top priority for Saddam was to escape the 
economic stranglehold of U.N. sanctions. Sanctions limited his ambitions in many 
ways, and took an enormous toll on Iraqi society. The disintegration of the middle 
class, civil infi-astructure, the health system, and the blight on the hope of young 
Iraqis were clear through the 1990s. The U.N. Security Council, in attempting to 
mitigate the effects of sanctions on innocent Iraqis created the Oil-for-Food (OFF) 
Program. It is instructive that the regime rejected the opportunity to export oil for 
civil goods until conditions were so bad that they threatened the survival of the re- 
gime. 

Chapter two makes clear the range of steps the regime took to erode support for, 
and the efficacy of, the U.N. sanctions program. The steps the regime took to erode 
sanctions are obvious in the analysis of how revenues, particularly those derived 
from the Oil-for-Food program, were used. Over time, sanctions had steadily weak- 
ened to the point where Iraq, in 2000-2001 was confidently designing missiles 
around components that could only be obtained outside sanctions. Moreover, illicit 
revenues grew to quite substantial levels during the same period and it is instruc- 
tive to see how and where the regime allocated these funds. 

ISO's investigation also makes quite clear how Baghdad exploited the mechanism 
for executing the Oil-for-Food program to give individuals and countries an economic 
stake in ending sanctions. The regime, following a pattern that Saddam has applied 
throughout his career, offered rewards and a rationale for accepting them, success- 
fully arguing its case that the sanctions were harming the innocent, and that the 
moral choice was to elude and diminish them. It is grossly obvious how successful 
the regime was. It is also grossly obvious how the sanctions perverted not just the 
national system of finance and economics, but to some extent the international mar- 
kets and organizations. 

The Procurement and Finance section notes that a sizeable portion of the illicit 
revenues generated under the Oil-for-Food program went to the Military Industrial 
Commission (the government-run military-industrial establishment). The funding 
for this organization, which had responsibility for many of the past WMD programs 



16 

went from approximately $7.8 million in 1998 to $350 million in 2001. During this 
period of growing resource availability, many military programs were carried out — 
including many involving the willing export to Iraq of military items prohibited by 
the Security Council. 

The remaining four chapters deal with the different types of WMD programs 
which Iraq had previously worked. The first of these, the Delivery System chapter, 
describes the work Iraq had been pursuing with respect to both missiles and un- 
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 

Iraq continued to work on missile delivery systems in the wake of the Gulf war. 
Saddam drew a distinction between long-range missiles and WMD — a distinction 
not drawn in the U.N. resolutions. Iraq's missile development infrastructure contin- 
ued to develop under sanctions, and included work on propulsion, fuels, and even 
guidance systems. As more funding became available following the implementation 
of the OFF program, Saddam directed more missile activities. In the later years, 
more foreign assistance was brought in — including both technology and technical ex- 
pertise. While it is clear that Saddam wanted a long-range missile, there was little 
work done on warheads. It is apparent that he drew the line at that point — so long 
as sanctions remained. However, while the development of ballistic missile delivery 
systems is time consuming, if and when Saddam decided to place a non-conventional 
warhead on the missile, this could be done very quickly. The CW and BW warheads 
put on Iraqi missiles in 1990 and 1991, for example, were built in months. 

A couple of points are of interest from the Iraq missile efforts. One is that they 
did not bide by the range limits set in U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. The 
range capabilities of the ballistic missiles they were developing exceeded the stated 
limits. Iraq also used components from SA-2 engines that they had expressly been 
prohibited. Iraq also produced fuel that was not declared. They also tested UAVs 
in excess of the range limits. 

Iraq missile developers became so confident that others would violate the sanc- 
tions that they designed new missile systems which depended upon the import of 
guidance systems. Further, they drew upon the foreign expertise that was readily 
available for such areas as propulsion. 

The chapter on nuclear programs reviews the program up to the 1991 war and 
describes the activities of the scientists and engineers following the war. The analy- 
sis shows that despite Saddam's expressed desire to retain the knowledge of his nu- 
clear team, and his attempts to retain some key parts of the program, during the 
course of the following 12 years Iraq's ability to produce a weapon decayed. 

Sanctions and inspections lasted longer that Saddam anticipated. The inspections 
were also more intrusive than expected. Therefore, retention of weapons material 
put at risk his higher immediate objective of escaping sanctions. Nevertheless, 
Saddam's son-in-law and chief weapons development manager, Husayn Kamal, di- 
rected that design information and very limited physical material be hidden from 
inspectors. These concealment efforts were successful until Husayn Kamal himself 
fled to Jordan in 1995. 

There were also efforts to retain the intellectual capital of nuclear scientists by 
forbidding their departure from Iraq and keeping them employed in government 
areas. However, over time there was decay in the team. Unlike the other WMD 
areas, nuclear weapons development requires thousands of knowledgeable scientists 
as well as a large physical plant. Even with the intention of keeping these talented 
people employed, a natural decay took place and the time it would take for Iraq to 
build a nuclear weapon tended to increase for the duration of the sanctions. The 
Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission utilized the same people in a range of projects dur- 
ing the 1990s and addressed technical problems akin to those in nuclear weapons 
development. These efforts, however, cannot be explicitly tied to an intention to re- 
vive a weapons program. 

Despite this decay, Saddam did not abandon his nuclear ambitions. He made clear 
his view that nuclear weapons were the right of any country that could build them. 
He was very attentive to the growing Iranian threat — especially its potential nu- 
clear component, and stated that he would do whatever it took to offset the Iranian 
threat, clearly implying matching Tehran's nuclear capabilities. Saddam observed 
that India and Pakistan had slipped across the nuclear weapons boundary quite suc- 
cessfully. Those around Saddam seemed quite convinced that once sanctions were 
ended, and all other things being equal, Saddam would renew his efforts in this 
field. 

The chapters dealing with CW and BW tell somewhat different stories. In the 
chemical weapons area, the Iraqis had long experience with production and use of 
mustard and nerve agents. In Baghdad's view, these weapons saved Iraq from de- 
feat in the war with Iran and, in combination with BW capabilities, helped deter 
the United States from deposing the regime in 1991. 



17 

Following the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi CW activity shifted from production to research 
and development of more potent and stabilized agents. In contrast to the nuclear 
field, CW work requires not thousands of scientists, but hundreds. The top expertise 
was developed among a few dozen scientists and chemical production engineers. 

Once inspections began in 1991, Iraq chose to yield most of its weapons and bulk 
agent as well as the large facilities that were widely known to exist. As in the other 
WMD areas, Saddam sought to sustain the requisite knowledge base to restart the 
program eventually and, to the extent it did not threaten the Iraqi efforts to get 
out from sanctions, to sustain the inherent capability to produce such weapons as 
circumstances permitted in the future. 

Over time, and with the infusion of funding and resources following acceptance 
of the Oil-for-Food program, Iraq effectively shortened the time that would be re- 
quired to reestablish CW production capacity. Some of this was a natural collateral 
benefit of developing an indigenous chemical production infrastructure. By 2003, 
Iraq would have been able to produce mustard agent in a period of months and 
nerve agent in less than a year or two We have not come across explicit guidance 
from Saddam on this point, yet it was an inherent consequence of his decision to 
develop a domestic chemical production capacity. 

Iraq denied it had offensive biological weapons programs to inspectors in 1991, 
and secretly destroyed existing stocks of weapons and agent in 1991-1992. Iraq de- 
cided to retain the main BW production facility, but under guise of using it to 
produce single-cell protein for animal feed. These decisions were taken with 
Saddam's explicit approval. Saddam clearly understood the nature of biological 
weapons. He personally authorized their dispersal for use in 1991 against coalition 
forces, Saudi Arabia and Israel. He clearly took steps to preserve this capability and 
was successful until 1995. 

Preservation of Iraq's biological weapons capabilities was simpler than any other 
WMD area because of the nature of the material. First, the number of experts re- 
quired is quite small, perhaps a couple dozen. Then too, the infrastructure to 
produce agent can be readily assembled from quite simple domestic civilian plants. 
Moreover, little, if any, activity would be necessary to keep this option "on the 
shelf. 

Some activity that might have been related to a biological program has been ex- 
amined closely, including work with a bio-pesticide, bacillus thuringiensis. While 
this work could have been related to advancing Iraqi anthrax knowledge, informa- 
tion is inconclusive. This work could and certainly did sustain the talent needed to 
restart a BW program; however, we can form no absolute conclusion on whether this 
work represented active efforts to develop further anthrax programs or not. Given 
the developing infrastructure in Iraq in the late 1990s and early 2000s, such a re- 
constitution could be accomplished quite quickly. 

Other aspects of the Iraq BW program remain cloudy. For example, it is still dif- 
ficult to rule on whether Iraq had a mobile BW production effort or made any at- 
tempts to work with smallpox as a weapon. 

What is clear is that Saddam retained his notions of the use of force and had ex- 
perience that demonstrated the utility of WMD. He was making progress in eroding 
sanctions and, had it not been for the events of September 11, 2001, things would 
have taken a different course for the regime. Most senior members of the regime 
and scientists assumed that the programs would begin in earnest when sanctions 
ended — and sanctions were eroding. 

A variety of questions about Iraqi WMD capabilities and intentions remain unan- 
swered, even after extensive investigation by ISG. For example, we cannot yet de- 
finitively say whether or not WMD materials were transferred out of Iraq before the 
war. Neither can we definitively answer some questions about possible retained 
stocks. Developments in the Iraqi Intelligence Services appear to be have been lim- 
ited in scope, but they were certainly never declared to the United Nations. What 
did they really represent and was there a more extensive clandestine activity with 
another set of technical experts? We cannot say for certain. 

Opportunities to develop new information are decreasing. However, I must men- 
tion that we just came into possession of a large number of documents recently ac- 
cumulated by coalition forces. The number of these documents is approximately 
equal to the total received since the end of the war, and it will clearly take many 
months to examine what has been found and provide an initial summary of what 
they contain. 

Then, too, we continue to receive a continuing stream of reports about hidden 
WMD locations. When such reports are judged sufficiently credible, ISG conducts an 
investigation. In fact, just 2 weeks ago a source provided a partially filled nerve 
agent container from a 122 mm rocket. This, like others recovered, was from old 



18 

pre-1991 stocks. Despite these reports and finds, I still do not expect that militarily 
significant WMD stocks are cached in Iraq. 

A risk that has emerged since my previous status report to Congress is the con- 
nection of former regime CW experts with anti-coalition forces. ISG uncovered evi- 
dence of such links and undertook a sizeable effort to track down and prevent any 
lash-up between foreign terrorists or anti-coalition forces and either existing CW 
stocks or experts able to produce such weapons indigenously. I believe we got ahead 
of this problem through a series of raids throughout the spring and summer. I am 
convinced we successfully contained a problem before it matured into a major 
threat. Nevertheless, it points to the problem that the dangerous expertise devel- 
oped by the previous regime could be transferred to other hands. Certainly there 
are anti-coalition and terrorist elements seeking such capabilities. 

It is my hope that this report will offer a generally accurate picture of the evo- 
lution and disposition of WMD within the former regime. I am quite aware that the 
Iraqis who participated in these programs will be reading this report and ultimately 
will comment upon it. I hope they learn from it and do not find too many errors. 

I spent hours with many of the Iraqi participants — both before the war as deputy 
chairman of UNSCOM in the 1990s and after the war when many were in custody. 
Many of these individuals are technocrats caught in a rotten system. Some whole- 
heartedly participated. In either case, Saddam channeled some of the best and 
brightest Iraqi minds, and a substantial portion of Iraq's wealth toward his WMD 
programs. It has, of course, been very difficult to discern the truth from these par- 
ticipants, given the mix of motivations that inescapably color the statements of 
those who remain in custody. It is sometimes very difficult to recognize the truth. 

This applies especially to Saddam himself, who was a special case in all of this. 
We had the opportunity to debrief him, but he naturally had limited incentives to 
be candid or forthcoming at all. Nevertheless, many of his statements were interest- 
ing and revealing. In the end, only he knows many of the vital points. Even those 
closest to him had mixed understandings of his objectives. In fact, there was uncer- 
tainty among some of his closest advisors about WMD and whether it even existed. 
It is ironic that when he had the weapons, they saved him. When he did not have 
them, he was deposed. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. 
General. 

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. JOSEPH J. McMENAMIN, USMC, 
COMMANDER, IRAQ SURVEY GROUP 

General McMenamin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 
very much for the opportunity to discuss the activities of the ISG. 
I have been in this position since June, when I replaced Major Gen- 
eral Keith Dayton. During these months, the ISG has remained fo- 
cused on searching for Iraq's WMD and associated WMD programs, 
supporting the effort to defeat the insurgency in Iraq and pursuing 
any additional leads concerning the fate of U.S. Navy Captain Mi- 
chael Scott Speicher. In addition, the ISG has been supporting the 
Regime Crimes Liaison Office in its efforts to assist the Iraqi Spe- 
cial Tribunal. 

Since Major General Da5^on left, three things have changed that 
bear on the mission of the ISG. First, the U.S. transferred sov- 
ereignty to the Interim Iraqi Government on 28 June 2004. While 
we did not anticipate any major changes to our operating proce- 
dures, we did carefully consider the conduct of post-transfer mis- 
sions and have worked to incorporate coalition combat units and 
the Iraqi Police Service whenever possible and practical. 

Second, the United States Central Command transferred oper- 
ational control of the ISG to the Multinational Force-Iraq. This 
shift was undertaken in conjunction with the transfer of sov- 
ereignty and occurred when all forces in Iraq were placed under 
the command of the Commanding General, Multinational Force- 
Iraq. 



19 

Third, there has been an increase in violence by former regime 
elements, foreign fighters, and common criminals, seeking to un- 
dermine and discredit the new Iraqi government. 

While Mr. Duelfer discusses the ISO's substantive findings, 
which are treated in detail in his comprehensive report, I would 
like to touch briefly on the other missions. The Speicher team ex- 
hausted all in-country leads regarding the fate of Captain Speicher 
and departed the ISG in May. No new leads have been developed 
since their departure. All data previously collected with regard to 
the status of Captain Speicher is with the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), which is in the process of writing an updated report. 
As stated during previous testimony on this topic, the ISG will im- 
mediately pursue any new leads or data generated in Iraq on the 
status of Captain Speicher. 

As for the counterterrorism mission, we are working at the direc- 
tion of the Multinational Force-Iraq to help neutralize former re- 
gime elements involved in the insurgency, working targeting and 
collection packages on Zarqawi cells, and following closely any po- 
tential links between the terrorists and chemical weapons. 

Our main support to the Regime Crimes Liaison Office is 
through the processing of documents in Qatar and Iraq and assist- 
ing with interviews of high-value detainees. The Regime Crimes Li- 
aison Office funds their own activities. No intelligence funds are 
used for this effort. 

The ISG will continue to support the DCI's post-report require- 
ments on WMD and the counter-insurgency fight in Iraq. The dedi- 
cation, professionalism, and enthusiasm of all members of the team 
have ensured that the missions assigned have been carried out 
thoroughly and in a professional manner. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to speak to the commit- 
tee today. I will finish this statement by thanking all of you for 
your support for what we have undertaken in the ISG and the con- 
tinuing support you provide to the Americans, Australians, and 
British, both military and civilian, who risk their lives daily in this 
endeavor. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General McMenamin follows:] 

Prepared Statement by Brig. Gen. Joseph J. McMenamin, USMC 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to meet with the committee today. 
It is a pleasure to speak with all of you today about the efforts of the great Amer- 
ican, Australian, and British members of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). 

I have been in position since June of this year when I replaced Major General 
Keith Dayton. During these months, the ISG has remained focused on searching for 
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and associated WMD programs, supporting the 
effort to defeat the insurgency in Iraq and pursuing any additional leads concerning 
the fate of U.S. Navy Captain Michael Scott Speicher. In addition, the ISG has been 
supporting the Regime Crimes Liaison Office in its efforts to assist the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal. 

As the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Pro- 
grams, Mr. Duelfer will discuss the ISG's substantive findings, which are treated 
in detail in his Comprehensive Report. My job has been to lead the military and 
civilian personnel who implement his collection and analytical guidance in a bid to 
uncover the truth about Iraqi WMD. I am also personally responsible for a wide 
range of other mission areas outside of Mr. Duelfer's responsibilities, as well as the 
safety and security of ISG personnel throughout Iraq and all personnel living at 
Camp Slayer. 



20 

Since Major General Dajdion left three things have changed that bear on the mis- 
sion of the ISG. First, the U.S. transferred sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi Govern- 
ment on 28 June 2004. While we did not anticipate any major changes to our oper- 
ating procedures, we did carefully consider the conduct of post-transfer missions and 
have worked to incorporate coalition combat units and the Iraqi Police Service wher- 
ever possible and practical. Second, United States Central Command transferred 
Operational Control of the ISG to Multi-National Force Iraq. This shift was under- 
taken in conjunction with the transfer of sovereignty and occurred when all forces 
in Iraq were placed under the command of the Commanding General, MNF-I. 
Third, there has been increasing violence by former regime elements, foreign fight- 
ers, and common criminals seeking to undermine and discredit the new government. 

The ISG currently consists of approximately 1,750 people, including personnel 
from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, of whom approximately 
750 work in Iraq. Except for a handful of logistics personnel in Kuwait, the remain- 
ing 1,000 personnel work in Qatar. We employ over 770 linguists from a wide vari- 
ety of Arabic speaking countries at our Qatar and Iraq locations. The United States 
contingent continues to represent a strong multi-disciplinary, interagency team with 
participation from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, 
the National Geospatial-lntelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, all the 
armed services (to include active. Guard, and Reserve components), and the Depart- 
ments of Justice, Treasury, and Energy. We expect our manning in Qatar to remain 
constant, but anticipate that our numbers in Iraq will decrease as we identify post 
Comprehensive Report requirements. 

The ISG is still based out of Camp Slayer, Iraq, near the Baghdad International 
Airport. We continue to conduct debriefings of the High Value Detainees at Camp 
Cropper. Initially, there was some confusion as to our ability to continue debriefings 
after the assumption of sovereignty by Iraqi authorities. We quickly determined, 
however, that we could conduct the debriefings under UNSCR 1546 and the letters 
annexed to the resolution. The only detainees we cannot interview are those who 
have been charged with crimes by the Interim Iraqi Government. Our expertise with 
the HVDs has been invaluable to the Regime Crimes Liaison Office and its support 
of the Iraqi Special Tribunal. We maintain a very good relationship with MNF-I's 
Detainee Operations and the Military Police assigned at Camp Cropper. This rela- 
tionship is an example of unity of effort by several commands for a single purpose. 

The ISG continues to operate the Combined Media Processing Center-Main 
(CMPC-M) at Camp As Saliyah in Qatar. We also operate Combined Media Process- 
ing Center-Baghdad (CMPC-B) with three satellite locations. The numbers of per- 
sonnel in Qatar have risen and we now have hundreds of linguists, analysts, and 
administrators working to triage, gist, and load the documents and other media into 
national databases. We completed scanning the bulk of the initial captured material 
during June, but we have recently acquired a large amount of additional material 
from various locations that needs to be triaged and scanned. Our document exploi- 
tation effort also supports the work of the Iraqi Special Tribunal through the Re- 
gime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO) and the U.S. Department of Justice has estab- 
lished a cell located within our Qatar operation to support the prosecution of regime 
officials. The Department of Justice provides funding for all RCLO and DOJ sup- 
port, no intelligence funds are used to support these law enforcement activities. To 
date 91 percent of the material translated or gisted has related to the search for 
WMD, principally in the areas of procurement and delivery systems. We have load- 
ed close to 150,000 files into the Harmony database, each of which consists of the 
original scanned document, the meta-file describing the document, and a gist or full 
translation. 

Our location at Camp Slayer is the hub for conducting ISG operations, analyzing 
the information gathered and providing command and control for the ISG. While our 
structure continues to evolve, we continue to maintain the organization of functional 
teams that conduct analysis and identify requirements for the collectors. Once a re- 
quirement is identified, an Operational Planning Team is formed from internal and, 
as required, external units. A task organized team with supporting units is built 
around analysts and subject matter experts, interrogators/debriefers, linguists, docu- 
ment exploiters, a chemical exploitation team and a Mobile Collection Team Com- 
mander. NOA provides mapping support and NSA provides target coverage. These 
task organized teams are led by and composed of coalition members and U.S. intel- 
ligence organizations. 

While Mr. Duelfer will address the ISO's substantive findings, let me provide 
some information on the scope of work that went into supporting the writing of the 
report as of 24 September. In recent months the ISO has: 

• Executed 2,700 Missions 

• Visited 1,200 different WMD Sites (Some more than once) 



21 

• Published 4,000 Intelligence Information Reports 

• Conducted 4,100 Debriefings 

• Scanned and Processed over 40 Million Pages of Documents 

• Processed 28,000 Digital Media Sources 

• Processed over 4 million Analog Media Sources 

ISG was given commander's guidance from MNF-I in two areas related to 
counterterrorism. The first was to assist in the defeat of Former Regime Elements. 
The second part of the commander's guidance was to assist in preventing a strategic 
surprise from Anti-Iraqi Forces using WMD. Through 21 September, ISO has pub- 
lished 680 intelligence reports supporting the counterterrorism/counterinsurgency 
mission. To reduce the chance of former regime scientists from linking with Anti- 
Iraqi Forces we developed contacts with the Iraq Ministry of Science and Technology 
and continue to work with the American Embassy on the scientist redirection pro- 
gi'am. 

The Speicher team exhausted all in-country leads regarding the fate of Captain 
Speicher and departed the ISO in May. No new leads have been developed since 
their departure. All data previously collected with regard to the status of Captain 
Speicher is with DIA which is in the process of writing an update report. As stated 
during previous testimony on this topic, the ISG will immediately pursue any new 
leads or data generated in Iraq on the status of Captain Speicher. 

In the area of security, we continue to make improvements in force protection 
measures to protect our people, whether they are on the road or in garrison. Al- 
though Camp Slayer has been attacked by both mortars and rockets, thankfully 
there have not been any casualties. I can't say enough about the support of the fine 
soldiers of the Pennsylvania and Kansas Army National Guardsmen and Reserve 
Component on whom I rely on heavily for force protection, escort missions and sup- 
porting camp operations. 

There continue to be many challenges facing the Iraq Survey Group. We are cur- 
rently developing a collection plan to gather information on the intelligence gaps 
identified in the Comprehensive Report. We will need to reevaluate the work load 
and processing time it will take to triage, scan, and gist the additional documents 
recently turned over to the ISG. We will need to balance our work load to ensure 
that MNF-I is supported during the crucial periods between now and the Iraqi elec- 
tions. Both the Iraqi government and MNF-I are focused on protection of key lead- 
ers and infrastructure, census taking, elections, rebuilding, and a rising level of vio- 
lence that the Iraqi government needs to counter by establishing and training effec- 
tive security forces. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to speak to the Committee today. The 
dedication and enthusiasm of all members of the team have ensured that the search 
for the truth about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction has been carried out thor- 
oughly and in a professional manner. I will finish this statement by thanking all 
of you for your support for what we have undertaken in the Iraq Survey Group and 
the continuing support you provide to the Americans, Australians, and British, both 
military and civilian, who risk their lives daily in this endeavor. 

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, General. 

We will proceed with a 6-minute round of questions. 

Mr. Duelfer, you spent a good deal of your professional career ex- 
amining Iraq and you were at one time a weapons inspector. Would 
you sketch that brief career or give us a brief description? 

Mr. Duelfer. I was chosen by Ambassador Ekeus to be his dep- 
uty at the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq in 1993, and so I was 
the deputy chairman of that U.N. organization for several years. In 
fact, I was the acting chairman of it at the end, when the 
UNSCOM ended and a new organization called the U.N. Monitor- 
ing, Verification, and Inspection Commission, which was headed by 
Dr. Hans Blix, began. That caused me to have a great deal of con- 
tact with the Iraqis, spend a lot of time in Iraq, and talk with the 
people involved in these programs. 

Then the DCI asked me, in January, if I would take the position 
as his Special Advisor on Iraq WMD, to succeed David Kay. 

Chairman Warner. We are fortunate you did. 



22 

My question will be very simple. It is asked frequently and it is 
discussed frequently. Is it your professional judgment that the 
world is better off with Saddam Hussein now in custody, facing the 
rule of law? 

Mr. DUELFER. In my opinion there was a risk of Saddam Hussein 
being in charge of a country with that amount of resources and 
with that amount of potential for both good and evil. What Iraq 
was, under Saddam, and the potential of what it could be, there 
was an enormous difference. 

The trends I think are important. Our analysis in this study was 
to not look at a single point in time, but to look at dynamics and 
trends. He clearly had ambitions with respect to WMD. He clearly 
had a strategy and tactic to get out of the constraints of the U.N. 
sanctions. He was clearly making a great deal of progress on that. 

But for the intervention of the events of September 11, I think 
the world would be in a very different position right now. 

Chairman WARNER. In conclusion, the world is better off with 
Saddam Hussein now in custody, facing the rule of law to account 
for his crimes? 

Mr. DuELFER. I am an analyst and I realize I am in a political 
world right now, but I have to agree analytically, the world is bet- 
ter off. 

Chairman WARNER. I thank you for that straightforward re- 
sponse, and it is predicated on many years of dedicated service. 

Mr. DUELFER. Thank you. 

Chairman Warner. Do you think that situation could have been 
achieved without the intervention of the coalition forces and the ac- 
tive use of military force in what appeared to be a complete and 
utter breakdown of diplomacy to achieve the goals that we have 
thus achieved, making the world better off? 

Mr. DUELFER. The way that question is sometimes framed, 
sir 

Chairman Warner. Why don't you reframe it in a manner with 
which you are more comfortable. I will get to it if I feel necessary 
and revise it. You go ahead. 

Mr. DUELFER. It is clear that Saddam chose not to have weapons 
at a point in time before the war. 

Chairman WARNER. Now, let us explain which war. You are talk- 
ing about the second one? 

Mr. DUELFER. The most recent one. 

Chairman WARNER. That is correct. 

Mr. DUELFER. When we look at the frame of reference that Sad- 
dam saw around him, he saw U.N. sanctions, he saw forces around 
him, he saw diplomatic isolation after September 11. He saw his 
revenue streams dropping. He chose, at that point in time, to allow 
U.N. inspectors in. 

As an analyst, I looked at that and I asked were those conditions 
sustainable? I fmd it hard to conclude that those conditions were 
stable or sustainable. So while Saddam chose not to have weapons 
at that point in time, the conditions which caused him to make 
that decision were. A, not sustainable; and B, extremely expensive, 
not just for the international community, but for the Iraqis them- 
selves. 



23 

Over the last decade, observing what happened to the civihan in- 
frastructure of Iraq under the sanctions is stark. I mean, here is 
a country with enormous talent. The people are educated, west- 
ward-leaning for the most part. They had a great education system. 
Watching that decay under sanctions was not a pleasant experi- 
ence. There was an enormous price for that. 

Those are some of the factors. Others will look at the data and 
draw other conclusions, but my opinion is that the conditions were 
not sustainable over any lengthy period of time. 

Chairman Warner. Had he lost his life by whatever means and 
the assets that he then had under his control had fallen into the 
hands of one or several of his children, particularly his sons, they 
clearly presented an equally, if not greater, danger to the world; 
am I not correct? 

Mr. DUELFER. From the discussions of the top people around 
Saddam — his ministers, military leaders — they were not fond of 
Saddam's offspring, and these people had a high tolerance for 
tough behavior. So I would have to agree with you that a succes- 
sion from Saddam to one of his offspring, while it is hypothetical 
and it is hard to imagine exactly how that would play out, was not 
a pleasant prospect. 

Chairman WARNER. Did you assess how many of the 17 U.N. res- 
olutions, that your facts clearly indicated, Saddam was violating? 

Mr. DuELFER. It was not our task explicitly to match up what we 
found on the ground against what the U.N. was requiring, al- 
though, because of my background, I certainly had an interest in 
it. It was quite clear that many of the things that we found were 
in clear violation of the U.N. requirements. He had missiles which 
exceeded the range. There was a lot of equipment which should 
have been declared. There were laboratories which should have 
been declared. In each of the weapons areas there were materials 
or things which were, to some extent, in violation of the U.N. sanc- 
tions. 

Chairman Warner. Let us go back to the U.N. Security Council 
resolution and what you now know about the likelihood of the ab- 
sence of large stockpiles of prohibited WMD. Can you explain why 
Saddam Hussein did not avail himself of the final opportunity to 
demonstrate full and immediate compliance with U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1441, thereby having avoided the use of force? 

Mr. Duelfer. Senator, it is a question which many of us have 
puzzled over. In fact, many very senior Iraqis have puzzled over 
the same question. It really requires you to get into Saddam's 
mind, and the answer is it is difficult to know for certain. Certainly 
some of his senior advisors, foreign affairs advisors, argued that, 
shortly after September 11, they should have just very fully com- 
plied without hesitation, without trying to negotiate. 

But what they say is that Saddam always wanted to negotiate. 
If he was going to accept inspectors coming in, he wanted to get 
something for it. He wanted to get sanctions lifted. He kept trying 
to bargain and barter, and he had not realized the nature of the 
ground shift in the international community. That was Saddam's 
intelligence failure. He did not understand very quickly the radical 
change of the international landscape. 



24 

One can understand that to a certain extent because in the pe- 
riod leading up to September 11 there was a great deal of sym- 
pathy for his regime. Baghdad was filled with businessmen. The 
international fair that Baghdad runs was often filled with lots of 
companies. They were making lots of transactions, in full violation 
of the sanctions. The ministers around Saddam, and Saddam him- 
self, expressed the opinion that sanctions were about to end 
through erosion, through their own collapse. 

So the radical change in a sense that occurred in the inter- 
national community following September 11, took a while to pene- 
trate in his judgment. 

Chairman WARNER. Given that 1441 was clear, it seems to me 
you could draw the conclusion that, his failure to avail himself, to 
avoid that destruction, and to enable him to remain in power shows 
a very irrational mind. Certainly, an irrational mind that was a 
danger to the world. 

Mr. DuELFER. Saddam is certainly dangerous. He certainly dem- 
onstrated the ability to make monumental mistakes. I remember a 
conversation I had with Tariq Aziz when I asked him: why did you 
invade Kuwait before you had a nuclear weapon? He more or less 
shrugged and pointed to the picture on the wall. The picture on the 
wall, in virtually any room you were in in Iraq, in those days was 
Saddam. 

So he is very shrewd. He has an exquisite sense of what moti- 
vates people, often at the basest level. But he is enormously sus- 
ceptible to making hugely dangerous decisions. 

Chairman WARNER. Thank you. 

Senator Levin. 

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

On page 64 of your report you say that, "The Iraq Survey Group 
has not found evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of 
mass destruction stocks prior to the war." Is that correct? 

Mr. Duelfer. That is correct. 

Senator Levin. Now, in addition to that, what you are telling us 
today is that, in addition to having no WMD stocks before the war, 
for the reasons you gave Saddam chose not to have those weapons. 
Is that correct? 

Mr. Duelfer. That is correct. 

Senator Levin. Those are stunning statements. Not only did he 
not have WMD, but, for the reasons you gave, he chose not to have 
WMD. That is 180 degrees different from what the administration 
was saying prior to the war. They were saying that he had stock- 
piles of WMD and indeed had an active effort to acquire more and 
was a threat for that reason. 

I just want to focus, not just on your speculation about inten- 
tions, which I think anyone can speculate on and it is fair enough 
to speculate on them, but in terms of the facts that you found, 
which are what you were assigned to find, to find the facts one way 
or another. Those particular facts it seems to me are pretty stun- 
ning. 

You also found, on page 7 as I read your report, that "Iraq did 
not possess a nuclear device, nor had it tried to reconstitute a capa- 
bility to produce nuclear weapons after 1991." Did I read that cor- 
rectly from your report? 



25 

Mr. DuELFER. Sir, I am sure you read it correctly. But if I might 
respond a bit to your premise, you used the word "speculation" and 
again as an analyst I would say it is not really speculation. What 
we were trjdng to do is derive information from the people we had 
the opportunity to talk to first-hand, including Saddam. So I just 
have to come back a little bit on that, with all due respect. 

Senator Levin. That is all right. 

But now I want to get to your nuclear program statement. You 
say that you found, as a matter of fact, that Iraq had not tried to 
reconstitute a capability to produce nuclear weapons after 1991. 
Therefore, it seems to me, you are saying that Iraq had no active 
nuclear weapons reconstitution program before the war. Is that cor- 
rect? 

Mr. DuELFER. What we said was that there was an attempt to 
sustain the intellectual capability and to sustain some elements of 
the program, particularly before 1995. But active nuclear weapons 
program, no, we found no evidence, nor do we judge that there was 
one. 

Senator Levin. All right. Now, relative to the aluminum tubes, 
your report says on page 21 that, "Baghdad's interest in high- 
strength, high-specification aluminum tubes is best explained by its 
efforts to produce 81-millimeter rockets." Is that correct? 

Mr. DuELFER. That is correct. That is my judgment, that those 
tubes were most likely destined for a rocket program. 

Senator Levin. Although you uncovered inconsistencies that 
raised questions about whether high-specification aluminum tubes 
were really needed for such a rocket program, in your words, 
"These discrepancies are not sufficient to show a nuclear end use 
was planned for the tubes." Is that your judgment? 

Mr. DuELFER. That is my judgment, recognizing that in Iraq the 
types of logic that we apply here do not always apply there. 

Senator Levin. That is your best judgment? 

Mr. DuELFER. Correct. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, you also found, on page 7 in the nuclear 
section, that "The Iraq Survey Group has uncovered no information 
to support allegations of Iraqi pursuit of uranium from abroad in 
the post-Operation Desert Storm." In another page you said that 
"The Survey Group has not found evidence to show that Iraq 
sought uranium from abroad after 1991." Is that your judgment? 

Mr. DuELFER. That is also what we found. 

Senator Levin. Now, relative to the mobile biological weapons 
production program, this is what you have stated in your report, 
"In spite of exhaustive investigation, the Survey Group found no 
evidence that Iraq possessed or was developing BW agent produc- 
tion systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons." Is that 
your conclusion? 

Mr. Duelfer. I am going to go a little longer on my response to 
that because it is a more complicated question or issue and the bi- 
ology area is one where there is less certainty possible. Part of that 
is due to the nature of the programs. If you were to do sensitivity 
analysis about that, little facts can make a big difference in that 
area. 

On the mobile production systems question, there were two trail- 
ers which were found in, I believe. May 2003. One found in Irbil 



26 

and one in Mosul. Those are clearly, in my judgment, for the pro- 
duction of hydrogen. They have absolutely nothing to do with any 
biological weapons. 

A second question arose from reports, largely from one individ- 
ual, about a production facility which was mobile. These were quite 
detailed reports, and to the extent we have been able to investigate 
that, we believe two things: One, that much of what this person 
said is incorrect. Some of what he did say was correct, but the ma- 
jority of the evidence which he was pointing to as a mobile produc- 
tion facility was wrong. 

However, this is one of those issues where I am not quite com- 
fortable in pronouncing that there was no mobile system in Iraq. 
We believe we have done as much investigation as we can. We 
have found no evidence. But I feel a little bit hesitant about declar- 
ing flatly that there was no mobile production facility. It is one of 
those cases where there may be some uncertainty. 

Senator Levin. Just in conclusion, though, the two trailers that 
were captured in 2003 that were stated to be part of a biological 
warfare program for the delivery of biological warfare, manufacture 
of biological warfare, those particular trailers you have found were, 
in fact, not part of a biological warfare program, is that correct? 

Mr. DUELFER. Correct. 

Senator Levin. Because those are the two trailers that the Vice 
President pointed to as definitively being the evidence of the bio- 
logical warfare program and the evidence of WMD. Those were the 
very trailers that the Vice President said, "This is the definitive 
evidence that Saddam Hussein had a weapons of mass destruction 
program." Now you are coming here today relative to those two 
trailers and telling us that, in spite of exhaustive investigation, you 
found no evidence that Iraq possessed or was developing biological 
warfare agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or rail- 
way wagons, and that those particular trailers were designed and 
built exclusively for the generation of hydrogen, which is a totally 
different purpose. Is that correct? Those trailers, just focus on those 
trailers. 

Mr. DuELFER. The two trailers that were captured in Irbil and 
Mosul are for the production of hydrogen. In my judgment, my firm 
judgment, and the judgment of most of the people who have looked 
at them, all of our experts, they have nothing to do with biological 
weapons. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you for that testimony. It just totally un- 
dercuts the statements which were made by the Vice President. 
Thank you. 

Chairman WARNER. Were you able to give a full response to that 
question? I want to make sure that the record has all of your 
thinking on it. 

Mr. DuELFER. The question of those two trailers is, to me, sepa- 
rate and distinct from the question of whether Iraq had a mobile 
biological weapons program. Our efforts to fathom that possibility 
departed from a source who subsequently turned out to be largely 
a fabricator. That does not mean there was not an Iraqi mobile bio- 
logical production capability. But we have not found evidence of 
that. 



27 

Again, the biology area is an area where, because it takes very 
few people, it takes very little in the way of resources, it is one of 
the areas where I think there is some risk that we might find new 
information that might change the content of this report. 

Chairman Warner. Very little area to conceal it, am I not cor- 
rect? 

Mr. DUELFER. It takes very little area to conceal. 

Chairman Warner. I thank you. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Duelfer, and thank you, Gen- 
eral, for your great work. 

I have a follow-up. So therefore, knowing the history of Saddam 
Hussein, his use of WMD, he had them in 1991, is there any doubt 
in your mind that if Saddam Hussein were in power today and 
there were no restrictions or sanctions placed on him that he would 
be attempting to acquire WMD, Mr. Duelfer? 

Mr. Duelfer. To me, I think that is quite clear. But more impor- 
tantly, it was quite clear to many of the senior advisors around 
Saddam. He had an exquisite sense of the use of power and influ- 
ence. To him it was a continuous spectrum — oil, military force 

Senator McCain. So there is no doubt in your mind, he is in 
power today, the sanctions are gone, he would be pursuing them, 
because that was his history? 

Mr. Duelfer. He had two life experiences where they saved him, 
which is I think why some of the prewar assessments were colored. 
I mean, people would kind of look at it and say, why would he not 
have these things. 

Senator McCain. Okay, let me lead you through a couple of ques- 
tions here because we have only 6 minutes. There is the belief 
purveyed by some that there was a status quo in Iraq where basi- 
cally the sanctions were in effect and things were fairly normal, 
and so therefore we really had a choice between the status quo and 
an attack on Saddam Hussein. 

Is it not more likely, as you have stated in previous testimony, 
the sanctions were being eroded and American airplanes were 
being shot at. As you just mentioned, businessmen all over Bagh- 
dad were thinking that it was a matter of time before the sanctions 
were lifted; we have a burgeoning scandal in the Oil-for-Food pro- 
gram, and there was not a status quo? In other words, there was 
a steady deterioration of any restraints, real or imagined, that Sad- 
dam Hussein may have felt? Is that an accurate assessment of the 
situation in Baghdad? 

Mr. Duelfer. That is a very accurate assessment. We spent a 
fair amount of time analyzing exactly that and trying to under- 
stand the strategy and tactics which Iraq was using to encourage 
the decay of sanctions. 

Senator McCain. So we did not have a choice between maintain- 
ing the status quo and attacking Saddam Hussein. We had a situa- 
tion which was rapidly deteriorating and eventually over time, in 
the view of most experts, Saddam Hussein would have been either 
relieved of or would have evaded these sanctions as more and more 
business was done and less and less actions on the part of the U.N. 
in enforcing those sanctions? 



28 

Mr. DUELFER. Sir, I think we detail, at great length, exactly 
those sorts of conditions, but we allow for others to draw their own 
conclusions. But my personal view is that the sanctions were in 
free fall. They were eroding and there was a lot of corruption. Were 
it not for September 11, I do not know that they would exist today. 

Senator McCain. There is also the belief in some circles that this 
was an idea that was hatched either in the Department of Defense 
or somewhere in the White House right after September 11: Let us 
go attack Saddam Hussein, and we will invent this WMD issue sort 
of as a pretext for it, and that there was really a hidden agenda 
there. 

Why, in your viewpoint, did every single intelligence agency on 
Earth that I know of, the British, our friends the French, the Ger- 
mans, the Israelis, every single intelligence agency believed, as our 
intelligence agency did, that Saddam Hussein had WMD? How do 
you account for that? 

Mr. DUELFER. Well, sir, that was not really my mandate. How- 
ever, I do have an opinion. 

Senator McCain. I would appreciate your opinion. 

Mr. DuELFER. I think there are a lot of factors involved in that. 
One, as I mentioned before, Saddam had an experience where these 
weapons were vital to him, so why would he not have them? Sort 
of logically, why would he not? 

Second, the United States had almost no contact with Iraq over 
more than a decade. To me, I sometimes forget that because I 
spent a lot of time there myself, but that was because I was with 
the U.N. That means that the analysts who were forced to make 
judgments about this were actually in a very poor position. They 
did not have any ground truth. They spent a lot of time looking at 
computer screens, but not a lot of time talking to Iraqis, not a lot 
of time walking around Iraqi plants and getting a feel for it. 

For example, if someone associates a particular vehicle with a 
chemical weapons program, as was done — there is something called 
a Samarra Decon vehicle. If you spend much time in Iraq you 
would realize the Iraqis could be selling ice cream out of those ve- 
hicles. To associate a particular vehicle with a particular program, 
it is that kind of a feel for the ground that was rare in the United 
States. 

Also, Saddam, as we learned from talking with him, was delib- 
erately ambiguous. He gave a speech, I remember it quite well, in 
June 2000 where he said in essence: "You cannot expect Iraq to 
give up a rifle and live only with the sword if its neighbors do not 
give up rifles and live with swords." He wrote his speeches himself 
largely, by the way. Now, that is kind of typical Saddamese, but 
it makes you think, well, he is saying he is going to hang onto his 
WMD. 

So we asked him what he meant by that. He said he had two au- 
diences in mind. This is a rare time when I think he actually was 
candid. He said he had two audiences. One was the Iranian threat, 
which for him was quite potent, palpable. The Iranian threat was 
very palpable to him, and he did not want to be second to Iran and 
he felt he had to deter them. So he wanted to create the impression 
that he had more than he did. 

Senator McCain. So every intelligence agency was fooled by him? 



29 

Mr. DUELFER. Including to a certain extent the Iraqi intelligence 
agency, because there were many Iraqis who were not convinced 
that there either were or were not special weapons within their ar- 
senal. 

Senator McCain. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I am serv- 
ing on the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. We need to 
find out why we are all so wrong. But I think it is important for 
everybody to keep in mind that it was every intelligence agency on 
earth that came to the same conclusion, and that is an important 
factor as we move forward with this continuing ongoing national 
debate about whether we should have attacked Iraq or not and 
whether there was sufficient justification for doing so, and if so 
why. 

I thank Mr. Duelfer. I appreciate your coming here at a very sen- 
sitive political time. I appreciate your candor, and I also under- 
stand that it is very inappropriate for you to get into any of the 
domestic policies, politics, of this country. I thank you. I thank you, 
too. General. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you. 

For the record, did you believe Saddam had WMD just prior to 
the use of force? 

Mr. Duelfer. My judgment was, I was at a think tank at the 
time, that I expected there to be a small number of ballistic mis- 
siles that would serve a function as a strategic reserve. I believed 
that he would have retained the capability to produce chemical or 
biological agents, but not have stocks. 

I felt that at the time he was keeping his nuclear expertise in 
four or five key facilities so that they would be better positioned 
to restart that program. Like others, this was an imperfect assess- 
ment. But that was basically from my experience at the U.N. Spe- 
cial Commission, from the unanswered questions. 

But I must say that when they took the decision, in February 
2000, to begin discussions with the U.N. about readmitting inspec- 
tors, to me that was a very key indicator that there probably 
weren't large stocks there to be found. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you. 

Senator Kennedy. 

Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I join my colleagues in expressing great appreciation for your 
service to our country. Let me just continue this thought, Mr. 
Duelfer. What would you say, on a scale of to 100, is the likeli- 
hood that we will ever find the stockpiles of WMD that the Presi- 
dent spoke about prior to the war? 

Mr. Duelfer. I think the prospects of finding, and I sound like 
I am trying to create jargon here, a significant stockpile is, I do not 
know, less than 5 percent. 

Senator Kents'EDY. It is less than 5 percent. You have more than 
1,000 people on your staff now. Press reports indicate that we have 
spent more than $900 million on the search for WMD, and your 
testimony says that you just obtained large numbers of documents 
that are approximately equal to the total previously received since 
the end of the war, and that will clearly take many months to ex- 
amine. 



30 

But is this not a total waste of money? Why does the search keep 
going on and on and on? Are we not at the point where we have 
to admit the stockpiles do not exist and this has obviously become 
a wild goose chase? The Bush administration had hoped we would 
find something, anything to justify the war. But instead, you basi- 
cally nailed the door shut on any justification for the war. 

At the present time, David Kay told Congress that there are ap- 
proximately 130 known Iraqi ammunition storage points in Iraq, 
some of which exceed 50 square miles in size, hold an estimated 
600,000 tons of artillery shells, rockets, aviation bombs, and other 
ammunition. The real question is whether these sites are ade- 
quately protected today or are they available to the insurgents. 

So, General McMenamin, can you assure us that all these sites 
are tightly secured by U.S. forces and no weapons could fall into 
the hands of the insurgents? 

General McMenamin. Sir, I cannot assure you that will happen. 
On the larger ones, we have security forces and overhead imagery. 
There is an active program, ongoing to destroy excess munitions 
around the country. On a regular basis, we are destroying excess 
captured munitions to keep them out of the hands of the insur- 
gency. 

As the Iraqi forces come on line in their security efforts, they will 
be able to take over and protect those assets to prevent them from 
falling into the wrong hands. 

Senator KENNEDY. My question is wouldn't the resources that 
you are spending to find WMD, that evidently do not exist, be bet- 
ter spent on weapons that do exist and that are threatening Amer- 
ican servicemen every single day? 

Mr. DuELFER. Sir, if I might just respond a bit on that. My task 
was not to find WMD. My task was to find the truth. I am quite 
proud of the work that we have done to delineate the program and 
to describe in detail, which anyone else can examine, what we did 
find. 

I am not suggesting that we should continue searching this. I 
think the staffing and the requirements to continue resolving these 
small remaining uncertainties is small. So you say wild goose 
chase. We have had a couple people die and we have had many 
people wounded. To tell them they have been involved in a wild 
goose chase to me is — it is not really what we were doing. We were 
meant to find what existed with respect to WMD. We were not 
tasked to find weapons. We were tasked to find the truth of the 
program, and that is what we tried to relate in this, and I think 
it was a worthwhile endeavor. 

Senator KENNEDY. We all understand that anyone who is wound- 
ed or dies in Iraq is a hero. They are there to serve, and the politi- 
cal decisions are made to send them over there. For all of us who 
have expressed concerns about this war, have the highest regard 
and respect for them. 

But the fact is we have had many distortions, misrepresentations 
about the facts. The American people are entitled to facts. John 
Adams says "Facts are stubborn things." We have seen distortions 
and misrepresentations about what is absolutely there. It is fair 
enough to wonder whether the $900 million that we are spending, 
that you say is a very remote likelihood of finding WMD, should 



31 

not be spent in other areas to guard what David Kay said was nec- 
essary to guard if we wanted to try to have an impact in terms of 
the ii^nericans. 

With all respect, Mr. Duelfer, we did not go to war because of 
Saddam's intent or future capability to produce the WMD. We were 
told that Saddam already had stockpiles of chemical and biological 
weapons and that he could acquire a nuclear weapon within a year, 
which he could then give to terrorists. That is what we were told. 

I understand from your testimony, that you mentioned out here 
in response to Senator Levin, Iraq did not possess a nuclear device, 
nor did it try to reconstitute a capability to produce nuclear weap- 
ons after 1991. Your report talks about Saddam's intent and future 
capability. That is not what the American people were told. Presi- 
dent Bush said on September 27, "Saddam must be prevented from 
having the capacity to hurt us with a nuclear weapon or to use the 
stockpiles of anthrax that we know he has" — "that we know he 
has" — "VX, the biological weapons which he possesses." 

Ten days later President Bush unequivocally stated: "Iraq pos- 
sesses and produced chemical and biological weapons." He contin- 
ued on October 7, "The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstitut- 
ing its nuclear weapons. If the Iraq regime is able to produce, buy, 
or steal, it could have a nuclear weapon." 

Secretary Rumsfeld said: "With regards to weapons, we know 
where they are. They are in the area around Tikrit, Baghdad, east- 
west." That is what the Secretary of Defense is telling the Amer- 
ican people. 

You have not been able to find them. 

Mr. Duelfer. Sir, I have spent more time with the Iraqi Sec- 
retary of Defense than the American Secretary of Defense. Ask me 
about Iraqis. 

Senator KENNEDY. I want to thank you very much. 

Mr. Duelfer. Thank you. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. 

Have you had adequate time to respond to Senator Kennedy's 
questions? 

Mr. Duelfer. I think so, yes. 

Chairman Warner. Fine. Thank you. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It seems as if we are talking about the two assumptions that 
took this administration into this war, I am very thankful that we 
are in this war, having to do with people disavowing that there is 
a connection between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. I just think 
it is important to have in the record, Mr. Chairman, some facts 
here. One was one of the reports that was disclosed about a year 
ago, in terms of the connection, that a highly classified 16-page de- 
fense document, memorandum has not been refuted to this time. 

It says that: "The unavoidable conclusion, Saddam Hussein's re- 
gime had been guilty as charged, tied for more than a decade to 
Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network for the purpose of 
waging attacks on their mutual foe, the United States of America. 
Top Iraqi intelligence officials and other trusted representatives of 
Saddam Hussein met repeatedly with bin Laden and his subordi- 
nates. U.S. intelligence received reports that Iraq provided safe ha- 



32 

vens, money, weapons, and fraudulent Iraqi and Syrian passports 
to al Qaeda, and also provided training in the manufacture and the 
use of sophisticated explosives." We know about that. Mohamed 
Haikmot Shakir facilitated the movement of two of the September 
11, 2001, hijackers, Khalid Midhar and Nawak al-Hamsi, through 
the passport control center and there were four meetings between 
Mohamed Atta and intelligence officials of Iraq. 

All of these things were drawing that connection, and I think we 
have adequately covered the fact that WMD were certainly ex- 
pected to be there by every intelligence force, including ours. Sen- 
ator Kennedy mentioned Dr. Kay and I can recall sitting next to 
Senator McCain when he was at this very table asking some of 
these questions: 

Saddam Hussein developed and used WMD? True. You are talk- 
ing about in the past? Yes, he used them against the Iranians and 
the Kurds. If he were in power today, is there no doubt that he 
would harbor ambitions to develop and use WMD? Absolutely, no 
question about that. Then the questioning goes on as to how much 
better off we are today. 

I was going to run over the German intelligence reports, the 
French, the Russians, the Israeli reports, but also our own reports. 
When President Clinton was in office he said: "I have ordered a 
strong, sustained series of air strikes against Iraq. They are des- 
ignated to degrade Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver weap- 
ons of mass destruction." There was no doubt in anyone's mind 
that this was going on. 

Now, I think probably the best question that has been asked 
here, and it has been answered by you and it has been asked to 
a number of witnesses so I will not ask it again, is are we better 
off today? I think people are so quick to forget the reports that we 
had about Saddam's bloody regime, about the lining up the 8,000 
people in the mass graves. Many people at this table have actually 
looked down into these mass graves. The lining up of 315 children 
and executing the 315 children; the policy of cutting tongues out 
if anyone is suspected of saying anjdhing about the regime. 

Mr. Chairman, you might remember this although you were not 
on the trip, in 1991 we had the first freedom flight. Alexander Haig 
and myself, and several others, went to Kuwait with Saud al- 
Sabaq. He was the ambassador to the United States from Kuwait. 
They did not even know the war was over there. This was right 
after it was officially over. 

I can recall the 7-year-old daughter of the ambassador. We went 
to their palace, they were of the royal family, only to find that Sad- 
dam Hussein had taken over that palace and used it as a head- 
quarters. I went up with this little girl to her bedroom and there 
were body parts. They had used it as a torture chamber. I saw a 
little boy there with his ear cut off because he was caught with an 
American flag. 

Now, I think anyone who is trying to use these two arguments 
for political purposes is going to have to answer that question and 
have to answer it in the positive, that we are better off, or deny 
that we are better off than we would have been if Saddam were 
still in power. So I think that is the thing that we have to look at. 



33 

I know I have used almost all my time, but let me just ask you 
a couple of questions, Mr. Duelfer. Thank you very much for your 
service, both of you. Would you describe Iraq's strategy and tactics 
to divide the Security Council and defeat sanctions? Would it have 
made sense, in your view, to stake our national security on the suc- 
cess of the U.N. sanctions regime? 

Mr. Duelfer. I think it is pretty clear that the Iraqi strategy 
and tactics to dividing the Security Council were having a fair 
amount of success. I think that is clear in the report when you see 
the amount of conventional military equipment that was being sold 
to Iraq, being transported into Iraq, in fact with the help of some 
Security Council members. 

There is, in my mind, little doubt that the trend, again prior to 
September 11, the constraints that the U.N. was able to put around 
Iraq were collapsing. 

Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Duelfer and General. I did have the opportunity 
to visit you and I appreciate the arduous circumstances and the ex- 
traordinary commitment that you and your colleagues have made 
to do your mission. 

Mr. Duelfer, let me follow up on a question that the chairman 
asked about your perception of the threat prior to the invasion. I 
think you indicated that you thought there might be some stock- 
piles, but I do not want to put words in your mouth. The question 
I have: At that point did you think that constituted an imminent 
threat to the United States and our interests? 

Mr. Duelfer. Bear in mind, I was not a member of the Intel- 
ligence Community at that time. I was just me with my own back- 
ground. 

Senator Reed. Given what we have learned, you might have been 
in a better position. 

Mr. Duelfer. It was my judgment that Iraq retained perhaps a 
strategic reserve, in other words a deterrent, not an offensive capa- 
bihty. 

Senator Reed. Let me ask you another question which I think is 
very interesting. You have had the opportunity to meet with Sad- 
dam. Why did he accept U.N. inspectors into his country with vir- 
tually unrestricted access? I think, as I recall, they actually discov- 
ered some of these missiles that were out of compliance and de- 
stroyed them? 

Mr. Duelfer. First let me correct a point in your premise. The 
way we debriefed Saddam was by one interlocutor who spent his 
entire time. My interaction with him was always one step removed. 

Senator Reed. Thank you. 

Mr. Duelfer. But the question why did he accept the inspectors, 
I think to the best we understand from what he has said, which 
is not always the truth, but from those around him, was that he 
recognized the growing pressure. It was clear that the military 
force buildup was taking place. His advisors finally convinced him 



34 

that, look, there has been a ground shift of the support in the Secu- 
rity Council away from Iraq. 

He was feeling isolation. Some of the revenues were tailing off. 
He was, I think, getting advice also from some of his friends on the 
Security Council who said: Look, the world has changed; you have 
some problems here. 

Senator Reed. That seems to be a pretty rational response for 
somebody who we have kind of labeled as a lunatic or delusional. 
That is just an aside. 

The inspectors on the ground, and you have great experience as 
a former inspector, were probably the best source of intelligence 
and information. They could have significantly increased our 
awareness of the true facts, difficult to get at, I grant you. But yet 
they were prematurely removed, very abruptly removed. In your 
judgment was that a wise decision? 

Mr. DUELFER. First of all, I have enormous respect for the in- 
spectors. There is no substitute for having people on the ground. 
That provides a lot of information. It provides a deterrent. 

But I would come back to the question of were those conditions 
sustainable? Hans Blix and his people were on the ground in an 
extraordinary set of circumstances. The United States had de- 
ployed a lot of forces. There was a crisis in the Security Council. 
So when I ask myself the question, were inspections working, are 
you asking a question which is at one point in time or is it over 
a continuum? 

I find it hard to convince myself that the circumstances which al- 
lowed the inspectors to be successful to the extent that they were. 
I do not think those conditions were sustainable. 

Senator Reed. I think you raise the issue of the length of sus- 
tainability. Certainly I would assume that you can see they could 
have been sustained for several more months at least. This coali- 
tion was a huge step, backing him down, forcing him to admit that 
the situation had changed, that the U.N. was going to crack down 
on him. Perhaps it would not have lasted for 2 or 5 years indefi- 
nitely, but for 2 or 3 months to 6 months, to 7 months, at which 
time we could have learned a great deal more about the very ques- 
tions we are debating now: Were those biological labs producing hy- 
drogen or something else? Was it a real nuclear program or was 
it sort of dormant? 

Mr. DuELFER. I am not sure I can answer that question, sir. 

Senator Reed. Mr. Duelfer, I respect you and I think that is 
probably a good answer. But certainly those questions should have 
been asked by our leadership. 

Mr. Duelfer. That is the heart of a good discussion and good de- 
bate, and I hope this report informs that discussion. 

Senator Reed. Let me ask you another question as my time al- 
lows. From what you said, this might be repeating your response 
to Senator Levin, Saddam consciously and deliberately ordered the 
destruction of virtually all of his WMD, chemical and biological and 
termination at some point of the nuclear program, which begs the 
question: If he was so intent on reconstituting a program, if this 
was his unshakable idea, why did he not simply hide small por- 
tions of this material? 



35 

Mr. DUELFER. He wanted to get out of sanctions. That was his 
priority. On a noninterference basis with that objective, he wanted 
to sustain, as we understand it from talking with him and his advi- 
sors, the intellectual capabilities and some bits and pieces of his 
programs that are hard to duplicate. 

This is particularly the case in the early years of the U.N. con- 
straints, from 1991 to 1995, and particularly the period of time 
during which his son-in-law, who was in charge of developing and 
had some pride of creation of these programs, was still around. But 
after he left in 1995, I think Saddam concluded that this business 
with the sanctions was going on longer than he expected. He did 
not anticipate the duration of these. He had to take other decisions, 
to include getting rid of some of the production capabilities and 
other things. 

Senator Reed. It seems that the sanctions were working. 

Mr. DuELFER. Again, if you look at it at a point in time and I 
hate to say this but, it depends what you mean by "working." The 
sanctions certainly were modifying Saddam's behavior. They were 
also having an enormous effect on the people in Iraq. Once Saddam 
elected to begin the Oil-for-Food program because of the devasta- 
tion on the Iraqi population and because of the threats that caused 
to his own regime, it provided all kinds of levers for him to manip- 
ulate his way out of the sanctions. 

So, again I come back to trying to avoid a static analysis and try 
looking at a more dynamic analysis, what are the trends, where is 
this headed. I apologize if I sound like I am disappearing into jar- 
gon here, but to me I think that is a distinction with a difference. 

Senator Reed. Thank you. General, thank you. 

My time has expired. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. Senator. 

Senator Allard. 

Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wonder, this is for both of you to comment on, if you would de- 
scribe the extent of the evidence that Saddam's regime destroyed 
materials, documents, and equipment, and whether your findings 
were accurately reflected in Saddam's 2002 report to the U.N. Se- 
curity Council? 

Mr. Duelfer. Sir, our task was not to compare what we found 
with the U.N. document, what was provided to the U.N. Likewise, 
it was not to compare what we found with prewar intelligence as- 
sessments. We had enough trouble just trying to determine what 
it was that was on the ground. 

However, in the process of doing that, it was quite clear that we 
were finding things which were certainly at variance with the U.N. 
resolutions. But we did not line up what we found with what Iraq 
was declaring. 

Senator Allard. But you did see enough evidence there that 
raised suspicions about the accuracy of the 2002 report to the U.N. 
Security Council? 

Mr. Duelfer. There certainly were errors in that report. 

Senator Allard. Errors did exist? 

Mr. Duelfer. Errors did exist, yes. 



36 

Senator Allard. Similarly, did you uncover more evidence that 
the regime engaged in additional destruction of WMD evidence 
after hostilities began in 2003? 

Mr. DUELFER. I think David Kay and I both have commented on 
that. There was a lot of destruction at sites, the intentional de- 
struction of documentation, materials. It is difficult to determine 
exactly what was removed and destroyed, but there clearly was a 
concerted effort in certain areas to destroy materials that would be 
helpful in our investigation now. 

Senator Allard. Would you care to speculate on the motivation 
for the destruction of those? 

Mr. DuELFER. Iraq had, throughout its existence, a denial and 
deception activity, for a multiplicity of reasons, one of which was 
to conceal whatever they had with respect to WMD from the U.N. 
inspectors, but also to protect the regime leadership in many ways. 
So it could have been related to many different things. 

There were also records unrelated to WMD, but perhaps related 
to atrocities, that they wanted to cover up. 

Senator Allard. So you do think, in your mind, that there were 
some WMD programs that they were trying to destroy evidence of? 

Mr. DuELFER. I have not said that, sir. I have said there were 
active steps taken to destroy things and materials which could be 
helpful to our investigation. I do not know what it was that they 
were destroying evidence of, so I cannot make that next step. 

Senator Allard. I see. 

Mr. Duelfer, your predecessor and certainly other recent commis- 
sions and government reviews have all concluded that we had poor 
human intelligence in Iraq to uncover or corroborate WMD facts 
and assertions. In your opinion, how did we get into that poor 
state? 

Mr. DuELFER. It is not my responsibility. Nevertheless, I do have 
opinions. Again, because we did not have relations with Iraq we did 
not have access for a long period of time. That is one factor. 

Senator Allard. It was a closed society. 

Mr. Duelfer. It was a very closed society. 

Senator Allard. It was very difficult to get people in there in the 
field to verify. 

Mr. Duelfer. That is true. While the UNSCOM was operating 
in Iraq, I take some pride in this, we had a great deal of informa- 
tion about Iraq that we made public. Our reports to the Security 
Council, which occurred four times a year, were quite detailed. I 
think perhaps people assumed that was a pretty good source of in- 
formation. But again these are just my opinions and I am not the 
best-positioned person to comment on that question. 

Senator Allard. On its face, Iraq is a closed society. They agree 
to have inspectors come into their country and then all of a sudden 
they kick them out. That raises suspicions about what is going on 
in the country as far as WMD, does it not? 

Mr. Duelfer. Certainly in December 1998 when Operation 
Desert Fox took place and there was 4 days of bombing. The U.N. 
Special Commission left Iraq. There was an enormous division in 
the Security Council at that time because there was a difference of 
opinion about whether that bombing should have taken place. The 
Iraqis, certainly Iraqis I spoke with, were actually quite satisfied 



37 

and pleased. One individual I spoke with, I remember, said: Well, 
gee, if we knew that that was all you were going to do, meaning 
the 4 days of bombing, we would have ended this earlier. 

But from December 1998 until December 1999, the Security 
Council was in complete disagreement over what to do with Iraq. 
There was not a consensus. It took them a full year to arrive at 
a new resolution. During that period of time, Iraq was obviously 
free to do what it wanted. It was clear that there was not a consen- 
sus on how to deal with Iraq and they would draw their own con- 
clusions from that. 

Senator Allard. I understand from your remarks the degree of 
uncertainty regarding involvement of the neighboring countries in 
Iraq's potential transportation of WMD or facilities. For example, 
we saw reports that Iraqi intelligence services would replace border 
security guards while cargo caravans crossed various border sta- 
tions. 

Do you want to elaborate on those assertions and facts? 

Mr. DUELFER. Our investigations looked a lot at what took place 
at some of the border points and surrounding the border crossing 
points. This is described in some detail in our report. Certainly 
there was a lot of activity related to the transfer of prohibited con- 
ventional munitions. The Muhabarat, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, 
was involved in that. They had people at these border points. There 
was a lot of traffic back and forth. There were reports about WMD- 
related materials crossing the border. 

But I still feel that we have not yet run down all the leads that 
we can on that. I am not sure we will ever be able to definitively 
answer that question, but I still think there are some avenues of 
explanation which we can pursue. 

Senator Allard. Are some of those papers in the volumes of in- 
formation you just acquired? Do you believe that they could be 
there? 

Mr. DUELFER. The documents, the customs documents, are not 
replicated in the books, but the discussion about some of the lines 
of inquiry we have had are included in that, including the role of 
the Muhabarat, the Iraqi Intelligence Service. 

Senator Allard. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Allard. 

Senator Nelson from Florida. 

Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Duelfer, thank you for your public service. I visited with 
your team over there about a year and a half ago. That is a dif- 
ficult place for you to operate in and I appreciate your public serv- 
ice. 

If you would, explain just a little more for the committee the fol- 
lowing quote from page 5 of your report: "The analysis shows that, 
despite Saddam's expressed desire to retain the knowledge of his 
nuclear team and his attempts to retain some key parts of the pro- 
gram, during the course of the following 12 years" — that is after 
the 1991 war — "the following 12 years, Iraq's ability to produce a 
weapon decayed." 

Can you describe that to us? How did that ability decay? 

Mr. Duelfer. The nature of a nuclear weapons program is such 
that you need large teams of very well-educated, highly-trained in- 



38 

dividuals. It is a complicated process. Despite Saddam's desire to 
retain that intellectual capital, over time those teams just decay. 
You just cannot sustain that. 

The people working on the trigger mechanism, the people work- 
ing on enrichment, the people working on materials sciences, and 
the people working on rotors for production of enriched material — 
there was a wide range of talent and expertise which just simply 
melted away, and that is what happened. 

Senator Bill Nelson. General, Scott Speicher is from my State. 
He is from Jacksonville. You have made the statement that the 
team that was there, which was doing a magnificent job, departed 
this year in May. 

General McMenamin. Yes, sir. Sir, they exhausted all in-country 
leads. They ran to ground everything they could find in-country, re- 
turned to the United States to work on their report with the Intel- 
ligence Community prisoner of war-missing in action (POW-MIA) 
cell. That report is with the Director of DIA right now for his re- 
view, prior to going to the Department of the Navy and SECNAV 
for his final assessment of the fate of Captain Speicher. 

Senator BILL NELSON. That is 5 months that they have been 
here. Why is there not a report forthcoming? 

General McMenamin. Sir, the last update I had, it was with the 
Director of the DIA. Other than that, I have no idea why it has not 
gone any further. 

Senator Bill Nelson. What advice would you give to the com- 
mittee for us to give any kind of comfort to the family that every- 
thing has been done and that the team has left Iraq? 

General McMenamin. Sir, basically with the team leaving Iraq, 
when they did their efforts to find the fate of Captain Speicher, 
that did not stop our efforts to pursue other leads. Any leads that 
we get in-country, we have individuals assigned that will actually 
work those leads, whether it is working with a unit in one of the 
different organizations, whether it is a source from a human intel- 
ligence, or whether it is a walk-in to any of our platforms. 

We will continue to pursue any leads that come up in-country or 
any leads that we get from the United States that may prove credi- 
ble enough that we can give the families some hope and comfort. 

Senator Bill Nelson. I know about some of those leads and we 
have not been able to follow up on them. 

General McMenamin. No, sir. It is extremely difficult to go to 
parts and about parts of the country right now to follow up on 
some of those. 

Senator Bill Nelson. Because of the difficulty of us having ac- 
cess as well as the explosiveness of the local population, the 
threats, the intimidation, the retribution, all of that? 

General McMenamin. Yes, sir, those are all parts. In addition, 
some of the sources are bedouins who move around quite fre- 
quently. They are extremely difficult to find. Some of them still do 
not trust any type of centralized government, just like they didn't 
before. But the leads that we get, we do pursue. We sort through, 
just as on the WMD side, we sort through scams and realities, to 
try to pursue the credible ones to ensure that we can do what we 
are supposed to do. 



39 

Senator Bill Nelson. In the 1990s we found his aircraft. The 
Iraqi government at that time, supposedly brought forth Scott 
Speicher's flight suit. We found a lot of the parts of the aircraft. 
Yet we found no other things, no identification badges. We did not 
find his pistol. We did not find any of this. 

General McMenamin. Yes, sir. 

Senator Bill Nelson. It is out there somewhere. 

General McMenamin. Yes, sir. It involves tracking down people 
somewhere in the country. Some are afraid to come forward. They 
are there. It is just going to involve getting to them and finding 
them and finding out what the answers are. 

Senator Bill Nelson. What do you think I ought to tell the fam- 
ily so that they have some assurance that this is going to happen, 
given the fact that it took raising Cain by three Senators in order 
to get this thing moving after about 8 years? 

General McMenamin. Sir, the only thing I would be able to tell 
the families is that we will not give up looking for him. If that 
gives them false hope, it should not. As time goes on and the situa- 
tion stabilizes, it will give us better access to people. Maybe people 
will be more forthcoming if their fears of retribution by either the 
insurgency or the former regime elements — but I would say that we 
will pursue the effort to the best of our ability to fmd a good an- 
swer for the family. 

Senator BILL NELSON. For your personal service, thank you very 
much. My "ought" that I have is with others who I think have 
dropped the ball. It is certainly not with you, it is not with your 
predecessor. It is not with all of those very courageous people who 
were part of that team that was sifting through every piece of de- 
bris that they could find in those prisons to get any shred of evi- 
dence. 

It is with the lethargy and inertia in these gargantuan organiza- 
tions that suddenly let the fate of an American flyer, who was 
walked away from suddenly, be lost in the bureaucracy. That I can- 
not stand. I can tell you, I speak for Senator Roberts as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Sessions [presiding]. Thank you. 

Senator Lindsey Graham. 

Senator Graham. Thank you. 

Mr. Duelfer, I have tried to put this whole issue in context and 
see if we can reach some type of sensible conclusions about what 
we are to draw from all this. Let us go back. The starting point 
to me is the use of WMD by Saddam Hussein. What kind of weap- 
ons are we talking about that he used? 

Mr. Duelfer. In the Iran-Iraq War, in the late 1980s, he used 
chemical weapons, both aerial bombs and artillery rounds. He used 
approximately 101,000 chemical munitions. They were mustard 
rounds, largely in the case of 155-millimeter artillery shells. There 
were 122-millimeter rockets with sarin. There were also aerial 
bombs. 

In the case of the domestic use in Halabja and other cities as 
well in northern Iraq, it was really the same mix, but they tended 
to be dropped from helicopters. 

The third use was in 1991, and this is where the ISG developed 
more new information. That is when the Shia were rising up; 



40 

again, they loaded helicopters with chemical munitions and used it 
against the Shia. 

Senator Graham. Were these weapons produced in-house or did 
he buy this material from someone or do we know? 

Mr. DUELFER. Certainly the weapons were manufactured in Iraq. 
Some components of those weapons and precursors of the agents 
that were acquired abroad. 

Senator Graham. But the actual making of the chemical bombs 
was done in Iraq, is that correct? 

Mr. DuELFER. That is correct. 

Senator Graham. So at one time he did have a chemical capabil- 
ity within the country? 

Mr. DuELFER. Absolutely. He had an enormous facility called the 
Muthanna State Establishment. There is a long discussion of that 
particular facility in one of the annexes of the report. It is a huge 
facility. I think it is like 5 kilometers by 10 kilometers, with dozens 
of buildings. It is quite a huge place. 

Senator Graham. Is 1981 the year that the Israelis bombed a nu- 
clear power plant? 

Mr. DuELFER. That is correct. In June of that year they bombed 
the Osirak reactor. 

Senator Graham. Do you believe that was a wise decision on 
their part? 

Mr. DuELFER. After that activity, the Iraqis really went full bore 
on a nuclear weapons program. I do not think I have a judgment 
on that, frankly. 

Senator Graham. The only reason I mention it is, was there ever 
a time that Saddam Hussein was engaged in trying to acquire a 
nuclear weapon? 

Mr. DuELFER. Oh, he certainly was. He had a very elaborate pro- 
gram. His top weapons designers freely admit that. They discuss 
that. The head of the program, Jaffar Jaffar, will tell you that. 
After being imprisoned, and only let out of prison if he agreed to 
begin a program to run a nuclear weapons program, he did that. 
That continued on until 1991. 

Senator Graham. So what we know thus far from history is that 
he had chemical weapons in-house, he used them on people to sur- 
vive, and that he was actively procuring nuclear weapons. Now, 
was there ever any evidence that he transferred any material to a 
third country? 

Mr. DuELFER. We have not come across evidence that he trans- 
ferred WMD materials to a third country. 

Senator Graham. Group or country, to anyone? 

Mr. DuELFER. We have some reports that we are trying to run 
down, as I mentioned earlier, of material moving out of Iraq just 
prior to the war. But if your question means was he sharing the 
wisdom and knowledge that he acquired about WMD, we have not 
seen that. But neither has that been a particular emphasis of our 
investigation. 

Senator Graham. But you are still searching out the issue of 
whether or not he may have moved some weapons material before 
the war? 

Mr. DuELFER. That is correct. 



41 

Senator GRAHAM. How large a container would you need to hold 
enough weapons anthrax to kill 100,000 people? 

Mr. DUELFER. If you have dried anthrax and it is properly dis- 
tributed, it does not take much in terms of dried agent. But you 
have to be able to deploy it. There are many scenarios that you can 
spin out. If you put it in an aircraft, like an agricultural type of 
aircraft, the amount of agent itself is very small. It is something 
that could readily fit in a small room. The device that you, or what- 
ever mechanism you choose to disperse this with, is another issue 
itself. 

But your point I think is that it is a very small amount of space 
in the biology area, and that is true. It is difficult to find these 
things. 

Senator Graham. Is it also fair to say that on paper there were 
many weapons unaccounted for, biological and chemical agents un- 
accounted for, given what we know he had before 1991 and the lat- 
est inspection efforts? 

Mr. DuELFER. Your term "unaccounted for" is well-chosen be- 
cause there is much confusion on this point. The U.N. Special Com- 
mission in particular but also the Monitoring, Verification, and In- 
spection Commission reported that it was unable to verify the dis- 
position of certain weapons. That is different than saying that they 
exist. So we were unable to account for them. 

Senator GRAHAM. Let us try it one other way. The Iraqi govern- 
ment was unable to account for it. 

Mr. DuELFER. Correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. So in conclusion, we have a very long history 
of use of weapons, procuring of weapons and, on paper, unac- 
counted-for weapons. I think what we need to learn from this is 
that we were wrong, and as a country we need to find out why we 
were wrong about some of our assessments. But as a world I think 
we need to come to grips with the idea that people like Saddam 
Hussein had too much opportunity to do too many bad things too 
long, and we should learn from that, too. 

Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I express my appreciation for your service, as well as for your 
being here today. 

It is my understanding that the report that is being released, Mr. 
Duelfer, will list companies that traded with Iraq after U.N. sanc- 
tions were imposed against trade. But the version to be made pub- 
lic will not include the names of U.S. companies due to a prohibi- 
tion in the Privacy Act; although the full version to be received by 
U.S. Government officials, including Members of Congress, will in- 
clude those American companies' names. 

But the report will name French, Russian, Polish, and other com- 
panies and officials that traded with Iraq. Some of the trade may 
not have been illegal, though much of it, I think in the words of 
the report, "was clearly illegal." 

Is this accurate? 

Mr. Duelfer. Sir, it was my view to put forward all the data, 
names of people, companies, countries that were involved in this, 



42 

because I felt it was important for people to understand that. Be- 
lieve me, I had to argue on this. 

However, with respect to the American names, lawyers have told 
me that the Privacy Act prohibits publicly putting out American 
companies' names. But they are included in the report, which is an 
official document provided to American officials. 

Senator Ben Nelson. I assume that you took their legal advice, 
but you may not have shared that opinion; is that fair? 

Mr. DuELFER. I am not a lawyer, so if someone tells me I am 
going to go to jail for something I tend to listen carefully. I mean, 
that is not what they told me, but they said: Look, this is the law; 
this is as far as we can go. 

Senator Ben Nelson. But isn't it interesting that we print the 
names of petty criminals in the police blotter sections in weekly 
newspapers across the country, but somehow the names of these 
companies do not get in? Apparently the Privacy Act does not re- 
late to foreign companies? Was that ever discussed with you or do 
you have any thoughts about that? 

Mr. Duelfer. It evidently does not. I would point out also that 
these data to which you are referring on oil vouchers and so forth, 
that data is going to become public anyway. It is part of many in- 
vestigations which are ongoing. The U.N. has an ongoing investiga- 
tion. It is documents which we received from the Iraqi government. 
So I think, as a practical matter, the full disclosure of all this is 
going to happen. But we cannot be a part of that. 

Senator Ben Nelson. Now let us go to the unaccounted for 
WMDs. You mentioned that your view going in was that you 
thought there probably was a strategic reserve for defensive pur- 
poses, not for offensive purposes. As you looked did you also believe 
that there would be some capability of delivering those WMD in a 
defensive posture? 

Mr. Duelfer. Again, this is just my own opinion. 

Senator Ben Nelson. I understand, it is your own view. 

Mr. Duelfer. Beforehand I had thought that there would be 
some small number of ballistic missiles, on the order of a dozen or 
15, with the capacity to be loaded with either chemical or biological 
agents, and this would be something as a deterrent, in a sense. 

Senator Ben Nelson. Did you have any indication that would 
have led you to believe that these existing stockpiles, small or oth- 
erwise, that were not found might have been secreted to Syria or 
some other place? 

Mr. Duelfer. I had no wisdom on that when I formulated my 
own opinions about what might remain. I was really drawing my 
judgment on the residual uncertainties from my work at the 
UNSCOM, from discussions with defectors when I was there, my 
sense from discussions with Iraqis during the years I was at 
UNSCOM, and the overall incentive structure that Saddam had. 
Those were the factors that led to my judgment on that. 

Senator Ben Nelson. But you had no belief, going in, that you 
would find large stockpiles or large delivery capabilities, as an as- 
sumption, as an expectation? 

Mr. Duelfer. My thought was that Saddam, the Iraqi regime, 
would have preserved the opportunity or the capability to produce 
chemical agent and biological agent if a decision were made to do 



43 

that. But this is just me as an individual. That was my judgment, 
that he would have retained the capacity to produce in a strategic 
buildup period, to put it in our kind of jargon. 

Senator Ben Nelson. In your previous statement you said that 
you saw the destruction, but you could not tell at what point the 
destruction of any stockpiles might have occurred. You also said, I 
think, that there was a deterioration just inherent in not keeping 
a nuclear program going because of the loss of staff and the loss 
of capabilities there. 

Do you think there was also a loss of potential capability in the 
ability to make WMD other than nuclear weapons if you were not 
in the process of making them? 

Mr. DuELFER. Less so in the other areas, because of the nature 
of the systems. Let me go back to an earlier part of your introduc- 
tion to that last question. You said we were not able to understand 
when these weapons were destroyed. We investigated that pretty 
extensively through interviews and so forth, and really what we 
found was most of the destruction was done in 1991, at various 
points throughout 1991. 

Senator BEN NELSON. So it was not just in advance of the inva- 
sion? 

Mr. DuELFER. No, not just in advance. I was talking about some 
destruction of evidence and materials that might have aided our in- 
vestigation. I just want to make sure that there was not a confu- 
sion on that point. 

To your second point or question really, the decay in the ability 
to produce chemical or biological weapons is different, again be- 
cause of the nature of the system. For biology, a small number of 
people that is required. The physical plant required is very small. 
So it would be easy for Saddam to conclude or assume that he has 
that capability and it is on the shelf. I said this in my testimony. 
Because he was able to do it in the past, because the people are 
still there, because he can produce indigenously, even if he has to 
start from scratch, fermenters, spray dryers, tanks, and dispersal 
systems, that is something which in his mind he would say: I can 
do that if I want to and it will not take me long to do it. 

Chemical is somewhat more difficult. It takes dozens of people in 
terms of the engineers, production engineers, and the chemists. It 
would be a bit more difficult depending upon the type of weapons 
system that you wanted to use. If it is simple dumb bombs, that 
is one thing. If it is missile warheads, that is kind of another thing. 

Interestingly, though, where he did choose to very openly violate 
the resolution was in the ballistic missile area, and that is an area 
where he tried to draw a distinction between WMD and long-range 
ballistic missiles. But he also, I think, understood this is a long- 
lead item. Building, indigenously certainly, the types of missiles 
that he was building, the Samoud II, took a lot of time. It was 
when he was in possession of a substantial amount of wealth, 
largely derived from the Oil-for-Food program, that he actually 
committed to those production programs, particularly around 1999 
and 2000. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. Senator Nelson. 



44 

I, just in general, would share the thought that, looking back 
over my comments at the time that we voted to go forward and au- 
thorize military action in Iraq, I mentioned WMD very little, but 
talked mostly about the consistent violation of Saddam Hussein of 
the 16 U.N. resolutions. In a sense, he violated his agreement for 
peace. He sued for peace when our military was moving forward in 
Iraq and he sued for peace and agreed to do a number of things, 
which he did not do. 

As "The Economist" magazine in London said, in I thought a 
very important editorial, the box was leaking. European nations, 
Russia, France, Germany particularly, were trading with him. The 
embargo was leaking. We were flying flights over Iraq on a daily 
basis and being shot at by his people and dropping bombs on him. 
We were at a point, as "The Economist" said, to either put up or 
shut up, to walk away or not. 

I am absolutely convinced had we walked away from Iraq he 
would have broken the embargo, utilized the vast oil reserves he 
had to reconstitute a military that would have been a threat to the 
world and reconstitute his chemical weapons system. 

That is just my view. That is what I said at the time. That is 
what I believe today. I know the CIA Director apparently, accord- 
ing to Mr. Woodward, told the President it was a slam-dunk that 
there were going to be WMD there. I do recall Chairman Warner, 
at least four or maybe six times, asking leading witnesses: If we 
undertake this war, are we going to find WMD when it is over? 
Every one said yes, and one of those was General Abizaid, I do re- 
call. 

So I just would say that people who talk about lying and mis- 
representation really need to be talking about were there reporting 
errors and errors in analysis, which is why we are passing, prob- 
ably this very day, a bill to reform and strengthen our Intelligence 
Community. 

Mr. Duelfer, you were asked by Senator Graham — I thought you 
were a bit reluctant to answer the plain question: How much space 
does it take to have anthrax that could kill thousands of people? 
Just how much would it be if it is properly handled? 

Mr. Duelfer. It is a matter of square feet in terms of the agent. 
It is something that it is a very small amount of agent. 

Senator SESSIONS. Could you put enough in one fruit jar to kill 
hundreds of people, if you know? Just yes or no, if you know. 

Mr. Duelfer. Again, the short answer, if you make the right 
kind of material and you disperse it correctly and the atmospheric 
conditions are right. I have listened to too many biological weapons 
experts to be able to just give you a straight yes or no answer. But 
it is a very small area, yes. 

Senator Sessions. Yes, certainly it is, and it is hard to find that 
if you have to look over a nation of 20 million people; it might be 
there. 

What about this report? I see that, I believe it is in July, we 
moved out more than 1.7 tons of enriched uranium and other radio- 
active materials from Iraq. What was that about? 

Mr. Duelfer. This is material that had been part of the Iraqi 
nuclear power plant production and had been under safeguards. It 
is not related to weapons programs. 



45 

Senator Sessions. Is it convertible to a dirty bomb or something 
of that nature? 

Mr. DUELFER. This is the concern, yes. 

Senator Sessions. So far as you know, now are there any other 
remaining nuclear materials in Iraq? 

Mr. DuELFER. None which have not been accounted for by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. I think we are pretty solid on 
that. When you say nuclear, Iraq for one reason or another, has 
these cesium lightning arresters all over the place. I have no idea 
why they do, but there are little pieces of cesium all over. So we 
have been trying to collect up as many of those as possible. But 
they are not considered to be a major threat. 

Senator SESSIONS. With regard to the discussion about whether 
or not the aluminum tubes were part of a nuclear reconstruction 
effort by Saddam Hussein, I would just recall that we heard both 
views of that in our intelligence briefings that we got and the 
Democratic nominees got if they attended. Some said it was and 
some said it was not. I thought it was connected to nuclear myself, 
based on the briefings. But it was certainly clear to those of us who 
listened to the briefings that some could interpret that differently. 

Did you form any opinion concerning former weapons inspector 
David Kay's comments that "We know from some of the interroga- 
tions of former Iraqi officials that a lot of material went to Syria 
before the war, including some components of Saddam's WMD pro- 
gram"? 

Mr. DuELFER. I would agree with all that up until the last point, 
because I do not believe we know that WMD-related material left 
Iraq to go to Syi'ia. There was a lot of material, a lot of things, in- 
cluding a lot of money, which left Iraq and went to Syria. 

Senator SESSIONS. You deny it or you just personally are not sure 
that was included in the things that went out of the country? 

Mr. DuELFER. We are unable so far to make a conclusion on that. 
We have seen reports, but what I can tell you that I believe we 
know is a lot of materials left Iraq and went to Syria. There was 
certainly a lot of traffic across the border points. We have a lot of 
data to support that, including people discussing it. But whether 
in fact in any of these trucks there was WMD-related materials, I 
cannot say. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think probably what happened to us was 
that we knew, and I guess you have confirmed in your own mind, 
that he used weapons, that he used chemical weapons against his 
own people and against the Iranians in the Iran War; is that cor- 
rect? 

Mr. DUELFER. That is correct, yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. You do not deny that he was developing a nu- 
clear weapon program when he was hit by the Israelis a number 
of years ago? 

Mr. DuELFER. No, he clearly had a nuclear weapons program. He 
clearly had ambitions in all of these areas. 

Senator SESSIONS. Do you believe he still harbored those desires 
to achieve in those areas? 

Mr. DuELFER. There is no doubt in my mind. 

Senator Sessions. I guess, frankly, that the fact he had had 
them previously, he had been given opportunities to demonstrate 



46 

how he got rid of them and he refused, I think that may have al- 
lowed, caused some of our experts to reach conclusions that we 
have not been able to establish at this point to be accurate. 

Senator Dayton. 

Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your candor and your persistence here 
today. 

The discrepancy between what we were told just prior to the war 
beginning, in terms of Iraq's WMD stockpiles and the absence 
thereof, is really to me staggering, and I want to just put into the 
record the statement that Secretary of State Colin Powell made be- 
fore the U.N. on February 5, 2003. He stated: "Our conservative es- 
timate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 
tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough to fill 16,000 bat- 
tlefield rockets." 

He also cited 18 trucks, mobile biological agent factories. 

Your report indicates that there were none of these supplies, as 
did Dr. Kay, on the battlefield, stashed away, or anywhere phys- 
ically to be found in Iraq. 

On the nuclear weapons question, Vice President Cheney stated 
on August 29, 2002: "On the nuclear question, many of us are con- 
vinced that Saddam will acquire such weapons fairly soon." Just 
before the war began, he said on Meet the Press on March 16, 
2003: "And we believe he has in fact reconstituted nuclear weap- 
ons." 

Your report, your testimony today, says: "The analysis shows 
that, despite Saddam's expressed desire to retain the knowledge of 
his nuclear team and his attempts to retain some key parts of the 
program, in the course of the following 12 years after the Gulf War, 
Iraq's ability to produce a weapon decayed." So he had less capabil- 
ity than he did in 1991 to produce a nuclear weapon. 

At the time when we were convinced to support the resolution in 
October 2002 that the President requested and at the time the 
President made the decision to commit American forces to the war 
in Iraq, we were told that Iraq possessed these magnitudes of 
WMD that constituted immediate and urgent threats to the United 
States. Based on what you have learned subsequent, would you say 
that assertion was correct? 

Mr. DUELFER. Sir, I do not want to be evasive, but again it was 
not our job to validate prewar intelligence. 

Senator Dayton. Based on what I just said here, which is the in- 
formation we were given? 

Mr. DuELFER. What we have found on the ground is at substan- 
tial variation from what you have described the prewar assess- 
ments were. I think that is quite clear. 

Senator Da\ton. I accept that. Thank you. 

Based on your overall knowledge of other nations, and maybe 
you do not have the expertise, either of you, to answer this, how 
many other countries would you say at that time or at the present 
time had WMD programs and weapons themselves greater in num- 
ber or development than Iraq? How many nations of the world? 

Mr. DuELFER. Sir, I do not know. Ask me about Iraq and I can 
drone on forever. 

Senator Dayton. All right, fair enough. 



47 

You mentioned in the closing of your testimony, Mr. Duelfer, 
something that was quite chilHng. This summer, you detected at- 
tempted or prospective links between foreign, you say here, "foreign 
terrorists or anti-coalition forces who were attempting to either ob- 
tain chemical weapons stocks or the experts in Iraq who were able 
to produce those weapons," and that you thought you had been able 
to get ahead of this problem, you said, through the raids this sum- 
mer. 

Do you still see that linkage or possible linkage as a threat? 

Mr. Duelfer. I do. I was a little bit reluctant to put much more 
into the public report on that because it is an ongoing force protec- 
tion kind of an issue. The Army raided a facility called the Al- 
Aboud Laboratory in an area of Baghdad which is known as the 
"chemical souk," and by chance they found a person there who was 
working on some ricin. 

So we quickly got involved in that. We quickly began to debrief 
him and ferret out his contacts and work a link analysis, et cetera. 
We pursued a series of raids pursuant to that, and we put together 
a picture of a series of efforts and a number of individuals who 
were trying to put chemical agent of various sorts into munitions, 
including mortar rounds. We think we have most of that particular 
activity, not under control, but we understand it. 

These individuals were anti-coalition people. They were not peo- 
ple who we identified with foreign terrorists. But it has certainly 
been the case that characters like Zarqawi have expressed an inter- 
est in exactly this type of weapon. But I think the resources of the 
ISG, the analysts and the ability to react quickly allowed us to get 
ahead of this problem, and I am quite proud of that. 

Senator Dayton. I am glad you did, yes. Thank you for doing so. 

It strikes me that one of the pretexts for this war was to prevent 
Saddam Hussein from dispersing his WMD to other forces, and a 
terrible irony of the effort would be if in fact that had not been oc- 
curring and did in fact occur as a result of our intervention there. 
I appreciate your intervention to prevent that. 

May I ask, regarding the long-range ballistic missiles that you 
cited, what are we talking about here in terms of the long range? 

Mr. Duelfer. The Al-Samoud, which was a weapon that he had 
and he fired several in the war, had a range which exceeded 150 
kilometers. I think it flight tested out to 180 kilometers. But in ad- 
dition, he had under development range extension programs that, 
by adjusting the fuel, in the near term he could have reached 250 
kilometers. Saddam had asked the development of much longer 
range missiles, including up to 600 kilometers. All of this was with- 
in the capabilities of the Iraqi scientists and engineers, aided and 
abetted by external assistance. 

Senator Dayton. My time is up. May I just ask you to respond 
briefly. How much longer do you think this investigation needs to 
continue? 

Mr. Duelfer. I am going to go back to Baghdad as soon as pos- 
sible, because it is safer there. I would anticipate some of the resid- 
ual issues can be pretty well addressed in the next month or two. 
This is not dragging on. I know some of the questions seem to say, 
why are we wasting all this money and time on this. 

Senator Dayton. Just asking. 



48 

Mr. DUELFER. In terms of subsequent reporting, what I would 
see is a potential of perhaps addendums on little defined issues. 
For example, was material shipped out of Iraq prior to the war; a 
judgment on that. 

Senator Dayton. Thank you again, both of you, for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Sessions. Senator Dayton, thank you. 

Senator Clinton, the vote has just started on final passage, about 
2 minutes or so. So if you would like to go now, fine. I think Sen- 
ator Warner will return after the vote. 

Senator Clinton. I would prefer to go now if I could. 

Senator SESSIONS. Good. You are recognized. 

Senator Clinton. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Duelfer and General, thank you both for your service, and 
please express our appreciation to your predecessors and all who 
served on the ISG. We have a deep understanding, based on the 
work that you have done, of issues that are quite difficult, and I 
thank you for that. 

Mr. Duelfer, when was your report finished? 

Mr. Duelfer. When it was in the printer, which was probably 
2 or 3 days ago. It is dated the 30th. I think the last volume of 
it actually trickled off the printer a couple days after that. 

Senator Clinton. Who have you or anyone on your behalf briefed 
with respect to this report? 

Mr. Duelfer. Briefed? 

Senator Clinton. Or discussed, presented the report? 

Mr. Duelfer. For my part, I have talked to people as this has 
progressed, including up here; earlier this morning, the Senate Se- 
lect Committee on Intelligence. I have had meetings with various 
people saying, where are things coming out, where are they going 
along. But in terms of the final report, it has not been briefed any- 
where other than to Congress right now. 

Senator Clinton. Have you had discussions with anyone at the 
Pentagon over your findings? 

Mr. Duelfer. I have not, no. 

Senator Clinton. Has anyone. General, on your staff or on be- 
half of the ISG briefed the report to anyone in the Pentagon? 

General McMenamin. No, ma'am. 

Senator Clinton. Have there been any briefings or any discus- 
sions of any kind, broadly construed, with anyone at the White 
House or the National Security Council? 

Mr. Duelfer. I have had discussions with a staffer over there, 
yes. Let me be careful. The report has been around and circulated 
for declassification purposes. A lot of people had to look at it for 
source protection reasons and for other issues, to make sure it was 
proper that it all go out publicly. 

Senator Clinton. So the report has been in circulation within 
the government. 

Mr. Duelfer. The report has been in the Intelligence Commu- 
nity and, frankly, it has been all over town in bits and pieces while 
people went through it to see if there was material in it that should 
not be out in the public domain. 

Senator Clinton. Mr. Duelfer, with respect to the ongoing dis- 
pute about aluminum tubes, is it your testimony that finally the 



49 

dispute has been put to rest insofar as it is possible to determine 
the use for the tubes? 

Mr. DUELFER. I have the advantage of being able to just make 
a call on this because the report goes out under my name. This alu- 
minum tube issue to me is just, to me it is rockets. 

Senator Clinton. It is rockets? 

Mr. DuELFER. It is rockets. 

Senator Clinton. So if the National Security Advisor on Sunday 
said of the tubes, "People are still debating this," is it fair to as- 
sume that she has not been briefed or not aware of the findings of 
the ISG? 

Mr. DuELFER. There may be people debating it in various places, 
but they debated it in front of me and I came to a conclusion and 
that is what I put in this report. Again, this is not an Intelligence 
Community report. I have the great pleasure of not having to go 
through an interagency process on this and made a call. 

Senator Clinton. But you are representing the best judgment of 
a thousand people who filtered information and evidence up to you. 

Let me ask, Mr. Duelfer, did you find any evidence that Saddam 
Hussein either passed weapons or materials or information to ter- 
rorist networks or that there was a real risk of him doing so? 

Mr. Duelfer. We found no evidence that he was passing WMD 
material to terrorist groups, but that really was not a strong focus 
of our work. 

Senator Clinton. So there is no evidence in your report that 
there was such a risk of him doing so? 

Mr. Duelfer. We did not address that. 

Senator Clinton. Is there any other source of information other 
than the work of the ISG that would present evidence sufficient for 
a statement such as that to be made that you are aware of? 

Mr. Duelfer. I am unaware of assessments on that, but I am 
not sure I would be aware. 

Senator Clinton. So if this morning President Bush said, "There 
was a risk, a real risk, that Saddam Hussein would pass weapons 
or materials or information to terrorist networks," he could not be 
relying upon your exhaustive report for that statement, could he? 

Mr. Duelfer. He had the talent and the knowledge existed in 
Iraq, so what Saddam did with it you again have to evaluate. 

Senator Clinton. But he is not talking about passing on talent. 
He is talking about weapons, materials, information. 

Mr. Duelfer. The report describes what we found on the ground, 
which was no stocks. There was a decision to sustain, to the extent 
they could, the intellectual capital. I am trying to say exactly what 
we have said here. 

Senator Clinton. I appreciate that because I think you have 
done a gi'eat service to your country, Mr. Duelfer. I sometimes fear 
that we are trying to turn Washington, at least, into an evidence- 
free zone. So the introduction of evidence and facts upon which rea- 
sonable people, I hope, can reach conclusions is a great service. We 
have seen too little of that. So I am very appreciative of the profes- 
sional way in which you have proceeded in the fulfillment of your 
function. 

Let me also ask you, Mr. Duelfer, as an experienced inspector: 
The conclusions you reached about the decay of the attempt to ob- 



50 

tain nuclear weapons is of great interest, I think, because we now 
are concerned about North Korea and Iran. We obviously were sur- 
prised by both India and Pakistan. Those states and perhaps even 
non-state actors who are attempting to obtain nuclear weapons is 
the greatest threat we confront, and that was certainly the case be- 
fore Iraq and now indeed after. 

Do you have any advice about the best way for the United States 
to try to degrade and decay such capacity so that we can be as- 
sured that proliferation will not pose a threat to us or to others 
around the world? 

Mr. DUELFER. The decay that occurred in the Iraqi program was 
a function of the sanctions and the limits, the extraordinary limits, 
put on this regime. We looked at some of the activities of these sci- 
entists in areas where we thought they might have been serving 
as a surrogate for nuclear-related activities. For example, there 
was a development program of a rail gun, which is an electro- 
magnetic — it is like a magnetic device for firing projectiles. We 
thought that that might be a surrogate for development of nuclear 
expertise. We looked at a series of projects like that, but we found 
that it was inconclusive. 

Drawing conclusions that would apply to a country like North 
Korea, it is difficult, frankly. Senator, because they are really so 
different. Iraq invaded another country and lost. It was subject to 
an extraordinary set of U.N. regulations. It fought a war with Iran. 
It has enormous natural resources. It has a population which is en- 
ergetic. They are great builders. It is in a different region, where 
many would expect just objectively to see Iraq as a country and its 
people really should be the hub, but by virtue of the leadership the 
difference between what is in Iraq and what could be is huge. 

I do not know. It is difficult for me to draw lessons for North 
Korea. But it is a very good question. Maybe others smarter than 
I can do it. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you so much, both of you. 

Chairman Warner [presiding]. Thank you. Senator. 

I thank the witnesses for their indulgence. We are now voting on 
the intelligence bill, which is of utmost importance. I had the last 
two amendments and I have voted, so I am going to remain. There 
is at least one Senator on the committee who desires to come back 
from the vote since that individual did not have an opportunity to 
ask questions. 

Would you like to take a 3-minute or a 4-minute stretch? 

Mr. DuELFER. Sir, I am used to Baghdad. This is fine. 

Chairman Warner. All right, that is fine. General, as a former 
Marine myself, you just stay where you are. 

General McMenamin. Okay, sir. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, I think we have had an excellent hearing. There are 
many ways to judge the quality and content of a hearing. 

Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry. I am back. I have 
been voting and I just got back. 

Chairman Warner. Good. I am in the middle of a speech. 

Senator Pryor. I will get out of your way then. 

Chairman Warner. A number of colleagues have come up to me 
on the floor and in the passageway and expressed tremendous sat- 



51 

isfaction with your testimony and the fact that you have come and 
the work you have done. General, of course you are the new boy 
on the block, but you are doing your job, too. 

My question at this point is, and then I will yield to my good 
friend here, is the record complete as to the future that you esti- 
mate for the ISG? You have 1,750 people. I am looking at your 
statement. General, and that is a considerable investment of people 
and capital. The General points out in his testimony we have a 
wide range of other mission areas outside Mr. Duelfer's responsibil- 
ity. 

So I think it would be helpful if you were to describe the force. 
The size is still 1,750. Do you contemplate to keep that size? What 
are the missions, and over what period of time do you hope to 
achieve those missions? 

General McMenamin. Sir, out of that 1,750, about 1,000 of them 
are down in Qatar running the Document Exploitation Center 
(DOCEX). They are the ones that will handle this large influx of 
material we just received. They will triage it, scan it, and get it 
into the national databases. Out of that 1,000 down there, about 
700 of those are linguists, both CAT-1 and CAT-2 linguists, who 
do the scanning, the triage, and things like that. So that is a large 
undertaking down there. 

Up in Baghdad we have about 750 folks. That is broken out be- 
tween a small DOCEX effort that focuses more on some tactical in- 
telligence, taking care of things. We have an analytical base that 
encompasses a WMD section, a counterinsurgency section, and a 
political-military section that handles the high-value detainees 
(HVDs) and Captain Speicher investigations. That is supported by 
a small staff, a security element, and a human intelligence element 
that works throughout Iraq. 

Based on the various missions we have, the numbers may change 
depending on the size and the questions that we need to follow for 
Mr. Duelfer's post-report requirements. We are looking at how we 
can better integrate and work with the Multinational Force-Iraq's 
collection efforts also so we can support over the next couple of 
months the requirements that Mr. Duelfer identifies and also Gen- 
eral Casey's requirements in the battle against the counter- 
insurgency and the counterterrorists, especially in these crucial 
months leading up to our elections, their elections, and our inau- 
guration. 

Chairman Wakner. That is a very clear statement. I thank you. 

You have indicated, Mr. Duelfer, that you are going to return, is 
that correct? 

Mr. Duelfer. That is correct. 

Chairman Warner. You have not specified the duration of this 
next chapter? 

Mr. Duelfer. No, but it is a much diminished task and require- 
ment. The General and I have been discussing the personnel re- 
quirements and so forth, but it is a very much smaller activity that 
will be required. 

Chairman WARNER. What work do you deem essential to com- 
plete this? 

Mr. Duelfer. The criteria I put is I do not want to be spending 
time and basically risking people's lives on things which are histor- 



52 

ical curiosities. My criteria is something which could materially af- 
fect the future. In other words, if we are uncertain about the dis- 
position of some fermenter tanks, there remains the possibility that 
there is a biology capability. So that is worth investigating to me. 

Chairman Warner. Of course, there are the facts that will be re- 
vealed from this very large tranche of new material which is down 
in the document examination. 

I have been recycling Senator Kennedy's question to you, Mr. 
Duelfer, in which he asked you the likelihood that we will ever find 
stockpiles of WMD in Iraq, and you said 5 percent. I kept thinking, 
in reply to my earlier inquiry, you said that biological weapons re- 
quired very little space in which to house, store, preserve, or other- 
wise keep a supply which could be extremely detrimental to a great 
number of people. Am I correct about that? 

Mr. Duelfer. Absolutely correct. 

Chairman Warner. So was that included in your 5 percent? Are 
we referring to large caches of WMD in terms of chemical pri- 
marily? 

Mr. Duelfer. The way I understood Senator Kennedy's question 
was large militarily significant stocks. The risk that there is a con- 
cealed biological capability of some sort to produce, that is the area 
where I am least confident, frankly. But because we have had ac- 
cess to those people we believe were involved in the previous biol- 
ogy program, that is where we draw some confidence that we think 
we have run this as well as we could. The most important analyt- 
ical approach on biology is the people, because there is a relatively 
small number. But by the same token, it could be two or three peo- 
ple that you never even heard of involved in this. 

So sensitivity analysis on this whole endeavor would say your 
weakest ground is in biology. 

Chairman Warner. I thank you very much. 

Now, Senator, we are delighted that you came back from the 
vote. Take your time. 

Senator Pryor. Thank you. 

Chairman Warner. We appreciate very much your staying with 
this hearing. 

Senator Pryor. Thank you very much. I will try to stay within 
my 6 minutes if at all possible. 

I would like to join the chorus of voices here thanking both of you 
for your public service. It is great service to this country and even 
beyond our borders. We really appreciate it. 

If I may, Mr. Duelfer, I would like to start with you. I read in 
this morning's "Washington Post," it said, "As head of the ISG, he 
worked independent of the CIA." Is that true? You worked inde- 
pendent of the CIA? 

Mr. Duelfer. I am an independent voice. I report to the DCI. 

Senator Pryor. Okay. "Independent of the CIA, and his report 
was not vetted or changed by the agency." Is that true? 

Mr. Duelfer. Other than for the declassification process, which 
I described earlier. I controlled the content. 

Senator Pryor. So they did not ask you to change it materially, 
just in terms of the classification aspect? 

Mr. Duelfer. Correct. 



53 

Senator Pryor. Did anyone else ask you, outside the CIA, from 
another agency or the White House or anybody else, to change your 
report? 

Mr. DUELFER. No. I received thoughts, which I solicited from peo- 
ple, because I think anybody who has a bright idea I am not averse 
to hearing it. But no one tried to influence the outcome. If they 
knew me, they would realize they would get the opposite reaction, 
if anything. 

Senator Pryor. Did you find any connection between Saddam 
Hussein's regime and September 11? I just want to be very clear 
on this because this has come up in numerous contexts. 

Mr. DUELFER. We were not looking for that, but we found none. 

Senator Pryor. Also let me just be clear on this question, be- 
cause this again has come up in this committee and other places: 
Is there any evidence that Saddam Hussein or his regime passed 
WMD to al Qaeda? 

Mr. DuELFER. We saw nothing. 

Senator Pryor. Is there any evidence that he attempted to do 
that or he was contemplating doing that? 

Mr. DUELFER. We saw nothing. 

Senator Pryor. As I understand your testimony from earlier 
when we started in the very beginning, you talked about the U.N. 
sanctions. I do not want to put words in your mouth, but as I un- 
derstand it, in your view they had a very limiting effect on his abil- 
ity to produce WMD? 

Mr. Duelfer. Among the effects of the sanctions were to con- 
strain his ability to produce WMD, and that is twofold. One is that 
there were some constraints, particularly in the early years, about 
what he could import, but it also modified his behavior because his 
prime objective was to get rid of those sanctions. 

Senator Pryor. So in that sense the sanctions had worked or 
were working. But also what you found, as I understand it, is indi- 
viduals and companies from China, Russia, France, and other coun- 
tries were willingly evading U.N. sanctions? 

Mr. Duelfer. I think the strength of the sanctions was clearly 
decaying, particularly after 1997. 

Senator Pryor. I think you mentioned they were in a free fall? 

Mr. Duelfer. I am a skydiver, so free fall is not necessarily bad 
in my book. 

Senator Pryor. Let me ask this. If those companies and individ- 
uals in China, Russia, and France were trading with Iraq, is it pos- 
sible they could do that without their government's knowing that? 

Mr. Duelfer. Yes. We try to be very careful in discussing when 
we know it was a company dealing with Iraq, when we know it was 
a government dealing with Iraq, or when we know it was a govern- 
ment-sponsored company dealing with Iraq. We saw evidence of all. 

Senator Pryor. Were these violations by these governments and 
companies and individuals aiding Saddam Hussein's attempted 
buildup of WMD? Were they aiding his WMD program? 

Mr. Duelfer. They were certainly aiding his weapons infrastruc- 
ture. They were certainly aiding his long-range ballistic missile ca- 
pability. They were certainly aiding in the sense that the domestic 
infrastructure was improving and that would shorten a breakout 
capability should he decide on that. 



54 

But we did not see specific imports, for example related to a bio- 
logical program, dedicated to a biological program, dedicated to a 
nuclear program, or dedicated to a chemical progr-am. 

Senator Pryor. I see. Now I want to ask you a question that I 
know you will get asked by the press, if you have not already. It 
is possible that you already have been asked this today. President 
Bush, when he was asked whether there were chemical and biologi- 
cal weapons that existed in Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
said: "Wait until Charlie gets back with the final report." 

My first question is, are you Charlie? 

Mr. DuELFER. If he says so. 

Senator Pryor. The second question is, just so I understand your 
testimony, you did not find evidence of chemical or biological weap- 
ons at the dawn of Operation Iraqi Freedom? 

Mr. Duelfer. We did not find stocks of either chemical or bio- 
logical weapons. 

Senator Pryor. Is your report in any way inconsistent with 
David Kay's findings? 

Mr. Duelfer. No. In some cases we refined some of the material 
he presented. We learned a bit more about some of the things that 
he originally found. We were able to flesh out some of the organiza- 
tions. For example, he first found some of these Muhabarat labs 
and I think we were able to get a better understanding of what 
they were about. 

Senator Pryor. In other words, you fleshed out his report? 

Mr. Duelfer. His report was really a snapshot of what they 
found. I think this is more of a synthetic picture of what was going 
on. 

Senator Pryor. Comprehensive view? 

Mr. Duelfer. It is really not inconsistent with what he 

Senator Pryor. Okay. Let me ask about a scenario that someone 
referred to a few moments ago, and you actually have it in your 
written statement. Maybe I should ask General McMenamin about 
this. 

There is a scenario out there that I think we in Congress are 
concerned about. What if insurgents team up with Saddam Hus- 
sein-regime chemical weapons experts? What if they team up and 
could cause quite a bit of damage there? Here is the question I 
want to ask the General: Do we have, in your view, sufficient re- 
sources on the ground in Iraq to prevent this? 

General McMenamin. I would say, for the military commanders, 
the intelligence effort that we have to try to identify these people 
is sufficient at the moment. One of the more successful programs 
that the embassy is running is the scientist redirection program. 
We are working with the embassy and the ministry of science and 
technology to actually employ some of these former regime sci- 
entists either here in the United States or in Iraq, which will also 
help the issue. 

Senator Pryor. The answer to my question then is what? Do we 
have sufficient resources on the ground? 

General McMenamin. Yes, sir. 

Senator Pryor. We do. Are we doing everything we can do to 
make sure that scenario does not happen? 



55 

General McMenamin. Sir, any time we get any notification of 
any type of chemical weapon, we send a team out. We interview 
sources, we run down sources. We have run down everjrthing from 
epoxy glue to baby powder to crude schematic drawings of missile 
systems that somebody took out of a book just so they can get some 
money. So we investigate every potential lead. 

Senator Pryor. Thank you. 

Mr. Duelfer, I am really out of time, but let me ask you one ques- 
tion. 

Chairman Warner. Senator, you go ahead and take another 
minute or two. 

Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Is this your final report? Are you planning on doing another re- 
port? 

Mr. Duelfer. This is a comprehensive report. I choose that word 
carefully because I think, as I mentioned, there are a couple little 
remaining issues where I think we can usefully develop more infor- 
mation, and if we do and if it is beneficial we will produce short 
addendums to this report. 

Senator Pryor. I would like to follow up on Senator Lindsey Gra- 
ham's question a few moments ago as well. He mentioned the unac- 
counted for WMD. You may not be able to say how much is unac- 
counted for in this arena but I would like at some point to get an 
answer to that. If you can say it here, I would like to hear it. 

In your opinion, what happened to the WMD that is unaccounted 
for? What is your view of that? 

Mr. Duelfer. The unaccounted for weapons really derive from 
the weapons which Iraq declared it had but was not able to verify 
the disposition thereof. There were 550 155-millimeter artillery 
shells with mustard agent. They were not able to account for those 
to the U.N. What happened to them? We may never really know. 

But as we find these residual chemical rounds, I think, about 53 
in the past several months we found, some of these unaccounted 
for weapons may just turn up that way. They are not a significant 
threat. 

Senator Pryor. Let me just be clear on that. These weapons that 
you found, the mustard gas, et cetera, are pre-1991? 

Mr. Duelfer. They were produced before 1991, that is correct. 

Senator Pryor. This really is my last question because I am in- 
dulging on the chairman's time here. If I can follow up with Sen- 
ator McCain's question, he says, basically we had two choices in 
Iraq. We could either keep the status quo or we could attack Sad- 
dam Hussein. I am not trying to be overly simplistic, but I think 
that is essentially what he said. 

But would you agree with me that actually we did have a third 
option, and that is that we could have the world rededicate our- 
selves to the sanctions? In other words, to use your term, to stop 
the free fall, to plug the holes of the leaky — and there has been a 
lot of analogies used today, but the leaky vessel, whatever we 
called it earlier? Could we not have done that and continued to 
thwart his ability to create WMD? 

Mr. Duelfer. Sir, I am really not in a position to answer that 
question. Just one thing I would point to, though, is the sanctions 
had a lot of effects far beyond addressing the Iraqi WMD capabil- 



56 

ity. When you see what happened to the Iraqi country, particularly 
now that we are there, you have to take that into account as well. 

Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, that is all I have. Thank you. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. Senator, for your par- 
ticipation. 

What has become of the scientists who worked on particularly 
the WMD, but biological programs as well? Do you have an ac- 
counting for how many of them are around and what they are 
doing? Is there some program to discourage them from working 
with some other organization, terrorists, or leaving the country and 
spreading their knowledge into hands which would bring along an 
adverse situation? 

Mr. DuELFER. Sir, we have a fair idea of where the prominent 
ones are. Some of them are in jail. Some of them are employed in 
Iraqi ministries. As General McMenamin mentioned, there is a pro- 
gram that the United States is sponsoring to employ some of these 
individuals. 

Frankly, it has been my experience that most of these people 
would rather pursue other lines of business, but they want to pur- 
sue a line of business that allows them to earn an income. Most 
of these people did not grow up thinking, gee, when I grow up I 
want to make anthrax. They were kind of channeled into that by 
a very odd regime. 

But I think for the most part we know where most of the biologi- 
cal specialists are and they are in Iraq. 

Chairman Warner. You know what efforts have been made on 
the nuclear programs in the former Soviet Union through the 
Nunn-Lugar programs. We have expended a lot of the taxpayers' 
funds to get a handle on where that material is and what is being 
done to keep it out of the hands of third parties. Russia has been 
extremely cooperative, I think, and we are continuing to press for- 
ward. 

Do we need a similar program here? 

Mr. DuELFER. Sir, I think that there is a State Department pro- 
gram along those lines. They have certainly come to us with re- 
quests for who the key individuals are. We have provided that in- 
formation to them. But it is outside of the direct mandate of the 
ISO. 

General? 

General McMenamin. Sir, our chem-bio unit, that does all the 
field testing, has worked a very good relationship between the em- 
bassy and the ministry of science and technology, and we actually 
have a very open dialogue with them to identify certain scientists 
who are either needed back here for the Department of Homeland 
Security or can be of use in Iraq. 

Chairman Warner. I thank you. 

What has been your observation about the prisoners in custody 
and to the extent that they have been forthcoming in providing us 
any information that has been of value in your work? I want to 
separate this, of course, from the situation with the Abu Ghraib 
prison and the military situation. That is slowly working its way 
through the judicial system of the Department of the Army, and 
this committee is interested in that as well. 



57 

But what they call the deck of cards, they are kept in facilities 
where there is an entirely different type of treatment being ren- 
dered. 

Mr. DUELFER. That is correct. Frankly, I think some of them 
have been very helpful. Some of them have not. It is my opinion 
that very little purpose is served by detaining some of them. 

Chairman Warner. You conveyed that to the appropriate au- 
thorities, your judgment on that? 

Mr. Duelfer. That is correct. 

Chairman Warner. That is good. I think that is helpful. So some 
of it has been fruitful from time to time? 

Mr. Duelfer. Some of them have been very helpful, and in fact 
I think it would be very interesting when some of them are re- 
leased for them to read this report and have a comment on it. 

Chairman WARNER. Lastly, you have been very helpful to the 
committee in giving your perspectives on Iraq and the future of 
Iraq, drawing on your many years of experience with the people. 
I am going to speak for myself. It seems to me the greatest hope 
for fulfilling the mission of giving the Iraqi people the freedom that 
they deserve, and hopefully want, is through the training of signifi- 
cant numbers of military, police, paramilitary, border, and the like 
to secure their country. 

We hosted Prime Minister Allawi, who is a very impressive man, 
and I had the opportunity to directly ask him questions along this 
line. The anticipation is that the numbers, which are currently 
60,000 to 65,000, could well go to 100,000 by the time the elections 
are held in January. 

But as you study that culture, do you feel that sufficient num- 
bers of people in Iraq will step forward, take on those responsibil- 
ities of providing for their own security, and in numbers which 
hopefully will enable our country to begin some phasedown of its 
force structure? You see these tragic situations where those lining 
up as recruits are the targets of suicide bombers. Yet those lines 
seem to form the next day. 

So I would be interested in your views on that, Mr. Duelfer. 

Mr. Duelfer. Sir, it is obviously unrelated to my report, but I 
have spent a lot of time there. My sense is that what they desire 
most is of course security. It does not take a genius to figure that 
out. If they have a structure to step into and they believe it is their 
structure, not a foreigner's structure, and that that structure is fair 
and represents Iraq, I think that will happen. 

I had a lot of very candid conversations with many Iraqis, even 
under Saddam. There are lots of discussions about the different 
tribes, clans, the Shia, and the Sunni. Many of them made the 
point to me, they said: Yes, over the last few decades we have ac- 
quired our nationality. We are Iraqis first. The way Saddam dis- 
bursed favor and so forth, he tended to reward groups and so forth, 
and he fended off threats to himself that way. 

But I think if there is a structure that is identified as an Iraqi 
structure, that is seen as something which will contribute to their 
future, that there is a true possibility that that will happen. 

Chairman Warner. I thank you very much. 

Senator Levin. Thank you. 

Senator Levin. Thank you. 



58 

Just a few questions, Mr. Duelfer. First on the UAV issue. As I 
read your findings on page 42, it is that, "Evidence available to the 
Iraq Survey Group concerning the UAV programs active at the 
onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom indicates these systems were in- 
tended for reconnaissance and electronic warfare." Does that accu- 
rately state your finding? 

Mr. Duelfer. That reflects our assessment. 

Senator Levin. Did you find any evidence in the documents that 
you looked at that Iraq had UAVs capable of or were intended to 
carry WMD? 

Mr. Duelfer. In their possession, no. 

Senator Levin. Relative to chemical weapons, on I believe page 
1 of the chemical section, your report says that, "While a small 
number of old abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, 
the Survey Group judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its 
undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991." 

Mr. Duelfer. Yes, that is correct. 

Senator Levin. You also found that, relative to the sites, the sat- 
ellite photos of sites that were stated to be suspicious chemical 
weapons storage sites prior to the war, on page 3 of your report "al- 
ternate plausible explanations for the activities noted other than 
CW-related activities." Is that accurate? 

Mr. Duelfer. Yes. This is referring to Secretary Powell's presen- 
tation to the U.N. Security Council, in particular the site called 
Musa-Ib, and there was some imagery of that. What we found on 
the ground was that what the Iraqis were doing there was unre- 
lated to chemical weapons. 

Senator Levin. Senator Pryor asked you about any evidence of 
a relationship to al Qaeda in the documents that you looked at, and 
I gather you answered in the negative to that question. How many 
documents did you look at? I do not know whether to ask you. Gen- 
eral, or who I look at for the answer to this, because you had some 
data in your prepared statement about numbers of documents, 
number of people. So whoever wants to answer that question. 

General McMenamin. Sir, we went through over 40 million 
pages of documents. 

Mr. Duelfer. I would hasten, we have also now acquired a like 
number. 

Senator Levin. So you have another 40 million more documents 
to look at. 

Mr. Duelfer. Another squillion, to put it in analj^ical terms. I 
am sorry. A lot. 

Senator Levin. A lot. 

But at least in the 40 million you have gone through, there was 
no such evidence, is that correct? 

Mr. Duelfer. The approach that it has gone through is a triage 
system. We have not put eyeballs on every page and looked at that. 
But the process that we have gone through has not yielded any- 
thing like that. 

Senator Levin. Then just one other question. I am trying to find 
out whether it was a conversation that you had or your folks had 
about his major concern. Apparently in the report you were quoted 
as saying that you were approached "multiple times during the late 



59 

1990s by senior Iraqis with the message that Baghdad wanted a 
dialogue with the United States." 

Mr. DUELFER. Myself among others, that is true. 

Senator Levin. "That Iraq was in a position to be Washington's 
best friend in the region?" 

Mr. DuELFER. That is something that a senior Iraqi said to me, 
that is true. 

Senator Levin. What came of those probes? 

Mr. DuELFER. Nothing. The policy was not to have a dialogue, as 
I understand it, with Baghdad at the time. But again, I was not 
part of those policy decisions. I just was the recipient. They saw me 
as a convenient American to talk to. 

Senator Levin. While we are waiting for the chairman, page 1 
of the biological section says that "Iraq would have faced great dif- 
ficulty in reestablishing an effective biological warfare agent pro- 
duction capability and that any attempt to create a new biological 
warfare program after 1996 would have encountered a range of 
major hurdles. The years following Operation Desert Storm 
brought a steady degradation of Iraq's industrial base. New equip- 
ment and spare parts for existing machinery became difficult and 
expensive to obtain. Standards of maintenance declined. Staff could 
not receive training abroad and foreign technical assistance was al- 
most impossible to get. Additionally, Iraq's infrastructure and pub- 
lic utilities were crumbling." 

Is that an accurate reading of your page 1? 

Mr. DuELFER. In the mid-1990s that is true. But with the im- 
provements in Iraq's domestic industrial circumstances as the 
1990s proceeded, it became less of a hurdle. It also is addressing 
a program on the scale that they had before the war, which was 
a very substantial program. We are not really addressing there the 
small types of terrorist type of concerns that so often people talk 
about with respect to biological weapons. 

Senator Levin. Thank you. 

Chairman Warner. Forgive me, I am trying to handle a matter 
on the floor at the same time. 

Senator Levin. I do not know if Senator Pryor had concluded. I 
did not have the gavel. 

Chairman WARNER. Thank you. As I said, I thought we have had 
a very good hearing, and I wanted to personally come back and 
thank you for the service that you have rendered, each of you, and 
continue to render. This committee would be very anxious to re- 
ceive such subsequent reports and opinions that you might have, 
as we intend to continually monitor this important subject. 

Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned. 

[The complete Table of Contents of the "Comprehensive Report 
of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD" follows:] 



60 



fCIA Homepage ) [Iraq's WMD Conientt] 



Comprehensive 
Report 



Contents 



Iraq's WMD > Contents 



Transmittal Message 
Acknowledqemenls 
Scope Note 



Volume I 



Regime Strategic Intent 

Key Findings 

Who Made Irac's Strategic Decisions and Detemnined WMD Policy 

Saddam s P'ace in the Regime 
The Asex of Power 
Personalized Rule 

Saddam s Unsettled Lieutenants 

A Fe.v Key Piayers m an Insular Environment 

Saddam Calls the Shots 

Saddam Shows She Way 

Harvesting Ideas and Advice in a Byzantine Setting 

Weaving a Culture of Lies 

Saddam Became Increasingly Inaccessible 

Saddam.s Ccm.mand By Violence 
Saddam's Effect on the Workings of the Iraoi Government 

Suspicion of Structures 

Powerless Structures 

The Higher Committee 

The Foreign Policy Committees 

Saddam s Grip on National Security ana WMD Development 

Saddam Holding Court 

Saddam and Fiscal Policy 
How Saddam Saw His Subordinates 

Mining Respect and Expertise 

Mutjal'ty of Fear 

Dazzled by Science 
How Saddam, Saw Himself 

Sadcam's Psycho'ogy 

Sadiam's Persona! Security 

Saddam the Dynasty Founder 

Saddam and His Sense of Legacy 
. Dominance and Deterrence Through WMD 

Saddam's Roie in WMD Poi.cy 

What Saddam Thought: The Perceived Successes of WMD 

What Saddam Thought: External Concerns 

Iran 

Israel 



Desire . 



hltp://w\vw.cia.gov/ciareportS/'iraq_\vmd_2004 contents. himl 



61 



The United States 

WMD Possession — Real or Imagined — Acts as a Deterrent 
Saddams Prioritization of Getting Out From Under Sanctions 
Efforts To Lift Sanctions 
Realizing Saddam's Veiled WMD Intent 

Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline 

Ambition (1980-1991) 

Decline (1991-1996) 

Scientific Research and Intention to Reconstitute WMD 

Reaction to Sanctions 

Husayn Kamil's Departure 

Cooperating With UNSCOM While Preserving WMD 

Recovery (1996-1998) 

Impact of the "Chicken Farm" Documents 

Looking Ahead to Resume WMD Programs 

Guarding WMD Capabilities 

Iraq's Internal Monitoring Apparatus: The NMD and MIC Programs 

Suspending Cooperation With UNSCOM 

Transition (1998-2001) 

Nullifying All Obligations To UNSC Resolutions 

Preser\'ing and Restoring WMD Infrastructure and Expertise 

Pumping Up Key Revenue Streams 

Miscalculation (2002-2003) 

Renewing UN Inspections 

Iraq's Other Security Concerns 

Sorting Out Whether Iraq Had WMD Before Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Alternative Hypotheses on Iraq's Nonuse of WMD During Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Annexes 

A The Quartet — Influence and Disharmony Among Saddam's Lieutenants 

B. Iraq's Intelligence Ser/ices 

C. Iraq's Sec urity Services 

D. Saddam's Personal Irvoivement in WMD Planning 

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Regime Finance and Procurement 

A Word on the Scope of This Chapter 
Key Findings 
Chapter Summary 
The Regime Timeline 
Ambition (1980-91) 
Decline (1991-96) 
Recovery (1996-98) 

Transition and Miscalculation (1999-2003) 
Directing and Budgeting Irag's Illicit Procurement 
Overview 

President and Presidential Secretary's Role in Illicit Procurement 
Presioential Diwan's Role in Illicit Procurement 
Diwan's Role in Supplemental Funding of Government Ministries 
Extent of Knowledge of the Former President of the Diwan 
Budgeting Iraqi Procurement 



62 



General Government Budget 

Sources of Government Revenue 

Supplemental Budgetary Process 

Supplemental Budget Submission Procedure 

Approval and Authorization of Supplemental Funding 

Disbursal of Supplemental Funds 
Financing Iraq's Illicit Procurement 
Overview 
Iraqi Econom/s Role in Illicit Procurement 

Economic Ambition (1980-91 ) 

Economic Decline (1991-96) 

Economic Recovery (1997-99) 

Economic Transition and Miscalculation (1999-2003) 
Iraq's Revenue Sources 

Bilateral Trade Protocols 

Phases of the UN OFF Program 

Disposition of UN OFF Funds 

Oil Voucher Process 

Secret Voucher Recipients 

Iraqi Oil Vouchers Provided to International Leaders 

American and British Oil Voucher Recipients 

Benon Sevan's Use of Iraqi Oil Vouchers 

Iraqi Intelligence Service Nominations for Oil Vouchers 

Oil Export Surcharges 

How Surcharges Were Collected 

Kickbacks on Commercial Goods Import Contracts 

Private-Sector Oil Sales 

Role of the SOMO 

SOMO's Relationship to the MoO 

Official Oil Accounts 
Banking and the Transfer of Financial Assets for Procurement 

CBI 

CBl's Role in Licensing Money Exchangers 

CBI's Role in Tracking Foreign Accounts for Iraq 

Iraqi Bank Holdings 

Funding of the Ministries 

The Use of Foreign Banks 

Use of Banks in Lebanon 

Use of Banks in Jordan 

Use of Banks in Syria 

Use of Banks in Turkey 

Use of Banks in Egypt 

Use of Banks in Belarus 

Regime Attempts To Recover Funds Prior to OIF 

The Role of Cash Transactions 

Iraq's Gold Reserves 
Executing Illicit Procurement in Iraq: Ministries. Commissions, and Front Companies 
Overview 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

MFA-llS Connections 

MFA's UN Sanctions Counter-Strategy 

MFA and Iraq's Bilateral Protocols 
Ministry of Trade 

MoTs Role in Procurement 

Facilitating Illicit Procurement With Cover Contracts 

Facilitating Illicit Trade Through Commercial Attaches 



63 



Ministry of Defense 

MoD Procurement Leadership 

MoD Procurement Directorates 

Budgeting and Financing Military Procurement 

MoD Procurement Process 
Procurement for the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard 
Military Industrialization Commission 

Procurement Leadership in the MIC 

MIC: Beneficiary of Illicit Funds 

MIC Banking and Financing 

Items Procured via the MIC's Link to Iraqi Intelligence 

MIC Front Companies 

Iraqi Intelligence Service 

IIS Procurement Leadership and Mission 

IIS Procurement Cooperation with Foreign Intelligence Services 

Items Procured by the US 

IIS Front Companies 
Special Security Organization 

SSO Procurement Leadership and Mission 
Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission 
Ministry of Transport and Communication 

Mission and Key Procurement Companies under the MoTC 
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research 

University Collaboration With MIC 

Exploitation of Academic Exchanges for Procurement 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Ministry or Interior 
Front Company Conglomerates: Al-Eman and Al-Handal 

The Al-Eman Network 

Al-Handal General Trading Company 
Supplying Iraq With Prohibited Commodities 
Overview 
Procurement Suppliers During the Decline Phase, 1991 to 1996 

Romania 

Ukraine 

Jordan 
Procurement Suppliers During the Recovery Phase. 1 996 to 1 998 

Syria 

Turkey 

South Korea 

People's Republic of China 

France 

Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

Bulgaria 
Procurement Suppliers in the Transition and Miscalculation Phases, 1998 to 2003 

Russia 

North Korea 

Transportation Routes From North Korea to Iraq 

Payment Methods for North Korean Contracts 

Poland 

Methods Used To Hide Transshipment to Iraq 

Polish-Iraqi Procurement Financial Flows 

India 

Belarus 

Key Belanjsian Individuals Unked to Illicit Trade With Iraq 

Materials, Equipment and Services Provided by Belarus 



64 



Payments From Iraq to Belarus 

Taiwan 

Egypt 

Yemen 

Opening Conventional Trade With Yemen for Oil and Cash 

Yemen Emerges as an Intermediary for Iraqi Illicit Imports 
Importing Prohibited Commodities 

Overview 
Deceptive Trade Practices Supporting Illicit Procurement 
Use of Trade Intermediaries 

Disguising the Nature of Prohibited Goods 

Consealing the Identity of Commodities 

Discussing the Commodity's Destination 
Use of Illicit Smuoqiinc and Transportation Networks 

Smuggling by Air 

Smuggling by Land 

Smuggling by Sea 

Smuggling via Jordanian Ports 

Smuggling via Syrian Ports 

Smuggling via the Arabian Gulf 

Annexes 

A. Translations of Iraq's Bilateral Trade Protocols 
8. Known Oil Voucher Recbients 

C. Iraq's Budqeian/ Process 

D. Iraq Economic Data 

E. Illicit Earnings Sources and Estimation Methodology 

F. Iraqi Oil Smugqiinq 

G. Iraq's Banking System 

H. UN Security Council Resolutions Applicable to Iraq 

I. Suspected WMD-Related Dual-Use Goods and Procurement Teransactions 

J. The Procurement of Conventional Military Goods in Breach of UN Sanctions 

K. Suspected Intermediary and Front Companies Associated With Iraq 

L. Procurement Acronyms 

Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline Events 



Volume II 



freturn to top] 



Delivery Systems 

Key Findinqs 

Evolution of Iraq's Delivery Systems 

The Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline 
Ambition (1980-91) 
Decline (1991-96) 
Recovery (1996-98) 



65 



Miscalculation (2002-2003) 
Resolving the Retained Scud-Variant Missile Question 
LiQuid-Propeliant Missile Developments 

Al Samud II 

Al Samud Warhead 

Al Samud II Warhead 
Solid-Propellant Missile Developments 
Al Path Missile Program 

Background 

General Characteristics 

Propulsion 

Guidance and Control 

Warhead 

Testing 

Material Balance 

Conclusions 
Al 'Ubur Missile Program 

Background 

Propulsion 

Guidance and Control 

Warhead 

Testing 

Conclusions 

Other Composite Solid-Propellant Systems 

Long-Range Ballistic Missile Projects 
Clusterino SA-2;Volaa Engines Designs 
SA-2 Conversions to Surface-to-Surface Missiles 
Large-Diameter Solid-Propellant Missile Proiect 

Program Development 
New Cruise Missile Projects 

HY-2 Range Extension 

Propulsion System 

Warhead 

Guidance and Control 

Conclusions 
The Jinin fJeninI Proiect 

Propulsion System 

Warhead 

Guidance and Control 

Conclusions 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Remotely Piloted Veh cles (RPVs) 

Brief History 
MiG-21 RPV 

Background 

Roles and Missions 
L-29 RPV (Al Bav'ah) 

Background 

Roles and Missions 
Huwavsh's Accounting of the L-29 RPV Program 

Conclusions 
Al Yamamah Proiect 

Background 
Ibn-Firnas UAVs 

Background 

Characteristics 

Missions 



66 



Foreign Assistance 

Conclusions 
Al Quds UAV Program 

Background 

Characteristics 

Missions 

Conclusions 
Procurement Supporting Iraq's Delivery Systems 
Infrastructure Improvements and Technology Developments 
Static Test-Finno Facilities 
Solid-Propellant Rocket Motor Case Manufacture 
Prooellant Production 
Solid-Propellant Motor Casting Chambers 
Production of Solid-Propellant Ingredients 
Propeilant Research 
Graphite Technolocv 
Carbon F oer F lament Winding 
Ceramic Warhead Effort? 
Proscribed Activities 

Violations of United Nations Sanctions and Resolutions 
Eouipment Restoration 
Undeclared Activities 
Role of the MTCR 

Annexes 

A. Resolving the Retained Scud-Variant Missile Question 

B. Liguid-Propeilant Missile Developments 

C. Solid-Propellant Missiie Developments 

D. People 123 



[return to tool 



Nuclear 

Key Findings 

Evoiution of the Nuclear Weapons Program 

The Regim.e and WMD Timeline 

The Early Years: Am.biiion 

Decline (1991-95) 

Recovery and Transition (1996-2002) 

Miscalculation (2002-2003) 
Results of ISG's Investigation on Nuclear Issues 
Investigation Into Uranium Pursuits and Indigenous Production Capabilities 

Foreign Pursuits 

Indigenous Production Capabilities 

Iraq's Known Uranium Holdings 
Iragi Uranium Conversion Program 
Aluminum Tube Investigation 

Elements of ISG Investigation 

Purported High-Level Interest in Aluminum Tubes 

Possible Association of Iraqi Nuclear Entities With the Tubes 

Tube Characteristics and Shipping Requirements 



67 



Indigenous Tube Manufacture — A Possible Sign Baghdad Did Not Need High- 
Specification Tubes 
Iraqi Interest in 84-mm Tubes 
Carbon Fiber 

Carbon Fiber and Iraq's Pre-1991 Gas Centrifuge Program 
Iraqi Concealnnent of Carbon Fiber-Related Activity. Materials, and Documents After 
Operation Desert Storm 

The MIC Carbon Fiber Project in 2001/2002 
Flow-Formino Machinery 
Planned Magnet Production Lines at Al Tahadi 

Procurement Details 
Rotating Machinery Department 
Investigation of Potential Centrifuge-Related Facilities 
Support Facilities 

Ash Shaykhili Storage Facility 
Al Karama State Company 
Al-Wazenya Site 

Khadimiyah Site (Ibn Al-Haytham Missile R&D Center) 
Al Samud Factory (Abu Ghurayb Missile Facility) 

Badr and Umm Al-Marlk State Companies (Khan Azad Military Production Plant) 
Al-Tahadi State Company 

Salah Al Dm State Company (Samarra Electronics Plant) 
Al-Nida State Company 

Rashid State Company's Tho Al-Fiqar Factory (formerly the Nassr State 
EstablishmentMechanical Plant) 

Ur State Company (An-Nasiriyah Aluminum Fabrication Plant) 
Uranium Enrichment— EMIS 

Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) 
Facilities 

Al Safa'a EMIS Plant at Tarmiya 
Al Faj-- EMIS Plant at Ash Sharqat 
Al-Jazira (Mosul Feed Materials Production Facility) 
Al-Zawra State Company 

Al-Nlda State Company (Zaafaraniya Mechanical Workshop Al- 
Rabiyah) 

Al-Radwan (Batra Military Production Facility) 
Al-Nassr Ai-Adhim State Company 
Disposition of EMIS-Related Equipment 
Laser Research in Iraq 

Laser Related Work After Operation Desert Storm 
Current Status and Future Potential 
Iraq's Pre-i991 LIS Efforts 
Rail Gun Summary 

Rail Gun Efforts 
Issues Related to NuclearWeapons Design and Development 
Casting Technology 

Explosive and Lens Fabrication Capabilities 
High-Speed Switches 
Fireset Development and Testing 
Neutron Generators 
Migration of the Capabilities From the PC-3 Nuclear Weapons Project 
lAEC Modernization 

Interest in the lAEC and Intervention by Saddam Husayn 

Increased Funding and Publicity of lAEC Activities 

Infrastructure Improvements at the lAEC; The Modernization Project 

Perceptions the Regime Was Preparing for Reconstitution of the Nuclear Program 



68 



lAEC Work on Neutron Generators 

University Programs 

Hidden Enrictin?ent Technology 

Survey of Structures at Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center 



Annexes 

A. Definitions Used by Teams Purina Survey 

B. Team Results 

C. Analysis of the Videotapes Compiled From Video Recce Mission 5/6 November 2003 



D. Results of Mission Survey of Tuwa.tha Nuclear ComoiexOver the Period 20-22 November 



E. Summary of Known UN-Taoaed Ecuipmen! 

F. Photography Hichaghts: Tuwaitha Mission. 20-22 Novennber 2003 

G. Tuwaitha Maps. Buildings, and Numbers 



Volume Hi 



rreturn to topi 



Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program 

Key Findings 

Evolution of the Chemica' Warfare Program 
Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline 
The Early Years. 1960-1980: A Slow Start 

The Chemical Corps and Al-Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham Research Foundation 
Full Capability. 1981-1991: Ambition 

Foundation of the Al Muthanna State Establishment 

Agent Production Begins and Al Muthanna State Establishment Takes 

Shape 

Early Weaponization: Simple Solutions 

CW — A Permanent and Pivotal Strategic Weapon 
The Decline, 1991-1996 
Destroying Iraqi Weapons 
Recovery and Transition. 1 996-2003 
Miscalculation, 2002-2003 
Command and Contro l 

Preamble: Muddling Through After the Gulf War 
Iraq Could Maintain CW Competence With Relative Ease 
Infrastructure — Research and Development 

Creation of the Iraqi Industrial Committee 

The Power of the IIC 

The IIC's Master Plan for Seif-Reliance: The List of 1 ,000 Chemicals 



69 



Dual-Use Chemicals on the List of 1 ,000 Chemicals 
Thionyl Chloride 
DCC 
Thiourea 
Chemicals From the List Move Toward Production 
Infrastructure — Production Capability 

State of Chemical Industry at OIF— Limited Break-Out Capability 
Weaponization 

Suspect Munitions Activities 

Disposition of CW Munitions Post-1991 

The 1991 Decision To Destroy Undeclared Weapons 

Iraq Unilateral Weapons Destruction in 1991 

Destruction of Chemical Munitions, Buli< Agent, and Precursors 



Chemical Munitions — Searching Military Depots and Caches 
Investigating Ammunition Supply Points 
Investigation 
Investigating Captured Enemy Ammunition Points (CEA Consolidation Points) 

Annexes 

A lis Undeclared Research on Poisons and Toxins for Assassination 

B. Al Mulhanna Chemical Weapons Complex 

C. The Iraqi Industnal Committee 

D. Tariq Company's Activities 
E Ai-Abud Network 

F. Detailed Preliminary Assessment of Chemical Weapons Findings 

G. Chemical Warfare and the Defense of Baghdad 

H. Summary of Key Findings at Captured Enemy Ammunition Consolidation Points 
I. Review of 24 Iraqi Ammunition Supply Points 



[return to tool 



Biological Warfare 

Key Findings 

Evolution of the Biological Warfare Program 

The Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline 

Evolution of the Biolugical Warfare Program 

Ambition: The Early Years, 1960-1985. 

Renewed Ambition and Near-Realization; 1985-1991 

The Beginning of the Decline: Opportunity Through Ambiguity and the End of the 

Game (1991-1996) 

Recovery and Transition 1996-2003 
Research and Development 



70 



Building Human Capital 
Research Facilities 
Iraqi BW Agent Research 

Bacillus anthracis ("Agent B') 

Clostridium botulinum (Botulinum toxin. "Agent A") 

Clostridium perfringens ("Agent G') 

Aflatoxin ('Agent C) 

Brucella 

Ricin 

Wheat Cover Smut ('Agent D') 

Viruses 

Camel Pox 

Smallpox 

Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever 

Acute Hemorrhagic Conjunctivitis (Enterovirus 70) 

Rotavirus 
Other R&D Related to BW Development 

Biopesticides 

Single Cell Protein R&D 

Growth Media R&D 
Drying Process/Carrier/Particle size 
Production Capability 
Break-Out Production Capability Pre-OIF 
Mobile Assets 
Weaponization 

Attempts at BW Weaponization 
The Gulf War 
Concealment And Destruction of Biological Weapons 
Iraq's Initial WMD Concealment Effort 
The Destruction of Iraq's BW 

What Remained Hidden and Undeclared 1995-1998'' 
Weaponization Related Activities m the Years Following Desert Storm 
Unresolved Issues 
Program Direction 
Research and Development 
IIS Laboratories 
Seedstocks 

Disposition of Iraq's BW Program Culture Collection 
Agent Production 
Drying of BW Agents 

Bacterial BW Agent Production and Storage 
Weaponization 

Annexes 

A. Bulk BW Agents 

B. BW Research and Development Facilities 

C. ISG investigation of Iraq's Reported Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production 
Capability 

D. Trailers Suspected of Being Mobil BW Agent Production Units 



Glossary 

[return to topi 

fClA Homep aeel f Iraq's "^-MD ContenKl 

[Whereupon, at 5:48 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 



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